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Culture and Fair Use
Michael P. Goodyear*
The intersections of race and copyright have been underexamined in legal scholarship, despite repeated calls for further scrutiny. The scholarship has so far focused primarily on identifying
where copyright has fallen short in protecting the creative works of
artists of color. This Article, instead, hopes to offer one viable solution for creating more inclusivity of different cultures in copyright:
the approval of cultural adaptations under fair use.
Cultural adaptations—the transformation of preexisting works
to reflect the cultural and social mores and norms of a different
group—would appear at first glance to be prohibited as derivative
works, which, under the Copyright Act, can only be created by copyright owners. A culture-centered approach to fair use, however,
offers the possibility of permitting at least certain cultural adaptations. While this question would be one of first impression for courts,
cultural adaptations can—and should—be understood to constitute
fair use. Cultural adaptations comment on and transform the original work by recontextualizing it for different cultural markets. In
addition, permitting cultural adaptations advances the goal of copyright and the public policy goal of diversity in expression and representation by fostering the creation of more works, and especially
more works for and by minority artists.
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bringing this article to print.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright offers protection for the works of all artists. Whether
an artist weaves a Navajo rug, composes a rap, fires a ceramic teacup, or films the next Hollywood blockbuster, the work should be
protected so long as it meets the basic requirements for copyright.
Copyright law has not, however, provided equal opportunities for
artists of all races. The Copyright Act is framed in a Western understanding of art and creativity—a poor fit for many traditional and
modern forms of creativity practiced by Black, Native American,1

1

The debate about whether the term “Native American” or “American Indian” is more
politically correct is a complex one. Michael Yellow Bird, What We Want to Be Called:
Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels, 23 AM. INDIAN Q.
1, 1 (1999). The general consensus of Native people appears to be that they prefer to be
identified with their specific tribe. See Amanda Blackhorse, Blackhorse: Do You Prefer
‘Native American’ or ‘American Indian’? 6 Prominent Voices Respond, INDIAN COUNTRY
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and Latinx communities, as well as others.2 This has allowed white
artists and industries to appropriate the artistic creations of other
races and cultures with little compensation to the original creators.
It has further facilitated the development of significant barriers to
certain genres.3 However, copyright can be recrafted in a way that
both considers and helps promote culture.
Almost immediately, one is confronted with the problem that the
term “culture” is inherently opaque and difficult to define.4 The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s
(“UNESCO”) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expression defines cultural diversity as the
“manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find
expression . . . [including] through diverse modes of artistic creation

TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/blackhorse-do-youprefer-native-american-or-american-indian-kHWRPJqIGU6X3FTVdMi9EQ
[https://perma.cc/G5WD-5QDA]. To address Native people as a larger group, this Article
uses the terms “Native” and “Native American” to identify those tribes historically residing
within the borders of the United States. Federal law instead refers to Native American
individuals as “Indian” or “American Indian.” 25 U.S.C. § 2201. Since this Article also
discusses the country of India, using those terms to refer to Native American persons could
be confusing for the reader. While Native Hawaiians are Indigenous communities within
the United States, the application of federal law to them has been different due to them not
being considered Indian for the purpose of federal Indian law. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1041–44 (7th ed. 2017) (noting that there
have been efforts to change this status quo). This Article uses the term “Indigenous” to
refer to all native peoples, both within and outside of the United States.
2
See K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady
Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 365, 365–66 (2008) (noting how
U.S. copyright excluded Black artists from the beginning of the United States); Sherylle
Mills, Indigenous Music and the Law: An Analysis of National and International
Legislation, 28 Y.B. TRADITIONAL MUSIC 57, 57, 62 (1996) (describing the noncommercial perceptions of arts and culture in Indigenous and other cultures).
3
See Greene, supra note 2, at 370–71 (describing the appropriation of Black artistic
creations by white people); see also Trevor G. Reed, Fair Use as Cultural Appropriation,
109 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1392–93 (2021) (describing how the flexibility of fair use has
permitted cultural appropriations of Native American culture and creative works).
4
Fiona Macmillan, Cultural Diversity, Copyright, and International Trade, in 2
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 411, 414 (Victor A. Ginsburgh &
David Throsby eds., 2014) (noting the inherent circularity of defining cultural diversity);
Sean A. Pager, Does Copyright Help or Harm Cultural Diversity in the Digital Age?, 32
KRITIKA KULTURA 397, 399 (2019) (“Such broad, somewhat circular language offers little
hint as to how to concretize diversity. . . . [I]n practice, different sorts of diversity tend to
be emphasized in different contexts.”).
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[and] production . . . .”5 Cultural activities, goods, and services are
those that “embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of
the commercial value they may have.”6 In the United States, a focus
on culture and cultural diversity typically centers around race, gender, political viewpoint, and other forms of sociologically created
differences.7 This Article uses the U.S.-centric understanding of culture, defining it specifically as a unique form of expression that is
produced, consumed, and recreated—at least in part, although not
exclusively or monolithically—by a racial or ethnic social group.8
Despite the important role of culture in copyright, it has largely
been unexamined in the literature. In 1999, lawyer and entertainment law scholar K.J. Greene found that legal scholarship mostly
neglected the relationship between culture and copyright.9 Despite
calls for examining the racial implications of intellectual property,10
this dearth of scholarship has largely persisted. Scholarship examining the relationship between minority cultures and copyright primarily focuses on identifying the problem of how U.S. copyright affects

5

Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
art. 4(1), Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 311.
6
Id. art. 4(4).
7
Philip M. Napoli, Diminished, Enduring, and Emergent Diversity Policy Concerns in
an Evolving Media Environment, in TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE INTERNET AGE 165,
167 (Sean A. Pager & Adam Candeub eds., 2012) (referring to the most central of axes of
social differences as influencers of culture). Cf. id. at 172–73 (discussing that other
countries typically understand cultural diversity to refer to different languages and
nationalities).
8
Future scholarship could apply the arguments articulated in this Article to cultural
works created on the basis of other axes of social differences, such as gender and sexuality.
9
K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21
HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 339, 342 n.11 (1999) (“Few intellectual property scholars
have examined the relationship between culture and copyright. This fact seems surprising
since much of the subject matter of copyright—art, music, literature, dance—must be
considered products of various cultures.”).
10
See generally Anjali Vats & Deidré A. Keller, Critical Race IP, 36 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 735 (2018) (offering “context for the conversations that are occurring in Critical
Race IP.”).
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minorities11 rather than suggesting solutions.12 In looking to rectify
the tension between culture and copyright, the most commonly advocated solution is the adoption of moral rights,13 a set of rights most
countries have incorporated into their copyright laws, but that remain largely unrecognized in the United States.14 A recent article by
Trevor Reed takes a unique perspective by arguing that cultural appropriation (of Native American works in particular) should be limited by reinvigorating the second fair use factor: the nature of the

11

See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and Race: The Case of Mirror Cover
Recordings 1–3 (Geo. Wash. Univ. L. Sch., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 2020-56, 2020)
(identifying the racial dimension inherent in music copyright through the example of mirror
covers); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing how U.S. laws benefit Native
American artists that want to market their crafts, but are poorly equipped to prevent all
unauthorized uses of Native American arts and traditions); Greene, supra note 2
(discussing how copyright protections pose disparate problems to different races and
genders, but have been particularly harmful to Black women); Bryan Bachner, Facing the
Music: Traditional Knowledge and Copyright, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 9 (2005) (noting
how copyright fails to protect traditional knowledge of Indigenous communities).
12
The most prominent exception is K.J. Greene, who suggested reparations as a possible
solution for past copyright wrongs against Black artists. K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black
Cultural Production, and the Debate Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1209–12 (2008). Anjali Vats and Deidré A. Keller suggested taking
a critical race lens to examine intellectual property, which could lead to more potential
solutions in the future. See generally Vats & Keller, supra note 10.
13
Moral rights, or le droit moral, protect the “part of the artist’s own being or personality
[that] is incorporated into the work,” providing artists with “certain perpetual rights . . .
that can affect future treatment of the work.” Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked
Tongue in the Global Debate on Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Is U.S.
Intellectual Property Law and Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native
American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 108–09 (2004).
Moral rights have been suggested as a solution for the disconnect between culture and
copyright by several scholars. See id. at 106–28 (advocating for the expansion of state and
federal moral rights protections in the United States); see also Greene, supra note 12, at
1202–07 (decrying the limited moral rights available under U.S. copyright law and how
moral rights violations have particularly harmed Black artists); Candace G. Hines, Note,
Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law: Historical Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L.
463, 492–93 (2005).
14
The scant moral rights that are available under the U.S. Copyright Act are based on
the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”). Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship
in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 282 (2004) (“The
enactment in 1990 of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) did grant limited attribution
rights, but only with respect to an extremely narrow class of works.”); see also id. at 300
(“VARA’s coverage is too limited to supply a meaningful source of attribution rights for
most authors . . . .”).
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copyrighted work.15 This Article, instead, acknowledges that cultural appropriation by white people is a problem, and that it will
likely remain one, but it reverses the lens to instead focus on how
non-white authors can culturally adapt works intended for white audiences to reach diverse and new markets. In a previous Article, I
advocated a standalone cultural adaptation exception for copyright
in the context of film in India.16 However, that proposal is outside
the realm of existing U.S. copyright law.
This Article, instead, hopes to offer one potential practical
method under the U.S. Copyright Act to mitigate the disparate treatment of racial minorities under U.S. copyright law. Drawing inspiration from my previous work on cultural adaptation in Bollywood,
this Article examines the question of cultural adaptation under the
U.S. Copyright Act. It proposes that under existing precedent, fair
use can be interpreted to allow cultural adaptations, increasing the
possibility for artists from different cultures to adapt works to their
own unique experiences and audiences.
In Part I, this Article traces some of the most notable ways in
which U.S. copyright law has excluded other cultures. Part II defines
cultural adaptations and how creative works are partially consumed
based on one’s race and culture. Part III sets the scene for the legal
analysis of this Article by examining whether the primary purpose
for copyright in the United States is to allow authors to profit or to
encourage the creation of new works. In Part IV, this Article explains how U.S. fair use offers an opportunity for cultural adaptations not present in other countries. It then fits cultural adaptations
within the confines of the four-factor fair use test. Part V explains
some of the most salient benefits of permitting cultural adaptations
under fair use before offering concluding thoughts.

15

Reed, supra note 3, at 1418–36.
Michael P. Goodyear, Adapting Indian Copyright: Bollywood, Indian Cultural
Adaptation, and the Path to Economic Development, 23 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 517
(2021).

16
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I. THE NEGLECT OF NON-WHITE CULTURE IN U.S. COPYRIGHT
The Copyright Act of 1976 does not explicitly discriminate on
the basis of race or culture.17 But copyright law was originally
crafted in a Western society strongly influenced by the forces of racism and nationalism.18 Race is the socially constructed differentiation of groups based on phenotype.19 Despite being a social construction, race (and its associated cultures) has long been a critical
factor in how the law has treated individuals, whether by design or
in effect.20 To understand the predicament of racial minorities under
copyright law, it is important to first examine the history of copyright law in the United States. Through the lens of critical race theory, this Part explains how the structural elements of U.S. copyright
law have left minority artists’ works unprotected and open to white
exploitation.
The rise of critical race theory from the 1980s onward increased
professional and scholarly consideration of how law affects different racial groups—with the ultimate goal being a “norm of ‘racial
equality’ where different groups will not continue to suffer the oppression and subordination that they have suffered.”21 While races
and cultures are continuously shifting and evolving, critical race theory has understood intellectual property principally as a model for
protecting white, or Western, privilege, as well as this group’s understanding of society.22 As communications scholar Anjali Vats

17

See Brauneis, supra note 11, at 1.
See Vats & Keller, supra note 10, at 745. It should be noted that copyright was
protected in the U.S. Constitution, which, when drafted, explicitly excluded Black men and
women from freedom and copyright protection for the works they created. See Greene,
supra note 2, at 365–66.
19
See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1994).
20
See id. (describing how race dominates every aspect of our lives, including the role of
and impact of law on individuals); see also generally Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as
Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293 (2018) (using disability law frameworks to examine and
address discrimination and structural inequality against Black people under U.S. law);
William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction,
100 KY. L.J. 1 (2011) (providing an overview of structural racism in U.S. law).
21
Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing Within Critical Race Theory:
An Exercise in Transformative Thought, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 21, 25 (2005); see also
Greene, supra note 2, at 367–68.
22
See Vats & Keller, supra note 10, at 740–41, 760–61.
18
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and intellectual property law scholar Deidré Keller concluded, a
study of race and culture in the context of intellectual property
should not be limited to the dichotomy of white and Black, but instead a comparison of the white or Western-created laws and their
effects on racial minorities.23
The structure of copyright protections and rights under the Copyright Act have long provided unequal opportunities for racial minorities and their cultural expressions.24 From 1776 until the 1960s,
U.S. intellectual property law’s relationship with artists of color was
defined by “appropriation, degradation, and devaluation.”25 The music industry, in particular, profited enormously from the innovation
of Black artists by capitalizing on fundamental genres of American
music such as ragtime, blues, and jazz, while providing minimal remuneration or recognition for those styles’ Black progenitors.26 Music is representative of how U.S. copyright law considered Western
perspectives on creative works, while failing to recognize nonWestern artists and artistic traditions. The structural elements of
U.S. copyright—(1) requiring fixation in a tangible form, (2) disfavoring improvisation, and (3) mandating a known, recently living
author—have led to lower compensation and recognition for racial
minority artists or withheld protection altogether.27
Fixation is a basic requirement for any U.S. copyright protection—the work must be contained in a tangible physical form.28 This
model of protection imposed a distinctly Western European tradition
on copyright for all music.29 While Western Europe has a tradition
of composers who drafted their music in written notation,30 other
cultures around the globe have often lacked a written composition

23

Id. at 761.
See id. at 771 (noting the “inadequacies of conventional intellectual property law to
protect all forms of knowledge”); see also Greene, supra note 9, at 367 (noting that
although copyright law is facially neutral, it was created in a society of racial inequality).
25
Greene, supra note 2, at 370.
26
Id. at 372–73.
27
See Greene, supra note 9, at 342, 378–79.
28
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102.
29
See Bachner, supra note 11, at 1.
30
Especially from the nineteenth century, orality gave way to composition and notation.
See Jason Toynbee, Copyright, the Work and Phonographic Orality in Music, 15 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 77, 83 (2006).
24
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tradition, instead placing greater emphasis on a keen musical ear and
improvisation.31
The centrality of fixation for music was set in an infamous court
decision from 1948. In Supreme Records v. Decca Records, Inc., the
issue before the Southern District of California was whether a white
singer’s cover recording of a song recorded by a Black singer was
lawful.32 In 1948, sound recordings were not yet protected under
federal copyright, so the case was brought under unfair competition
law.33 But, in deciding the case, Judge Yankwich imposed his own
(white) musical tastes on intellectual property law; he concluded the
original recording by a Black artist was “thi[c]k, mechanical, [and]
lacking inspiration,” while a cover created by a white artist was
“rich, against a musically colorful background. . . . sound[ing] full,
meaty, [and] polished.”34 In addition, he held that anything added to
a song in a recording alone, rather than the underlying musical work,
could be freely copied.35 This was disastrous for Black and other
non-white musicians, many of whom did not write down their songs
in musical notation, which was necessary prior to 1978 to receive
copyright protection for musical works.36
This long-standing bias favoring written over oral music37 is inherent in U.S. copyright law, leaving out protections for Black and
other musical traditions. For example, African tribal music was
transmitted orally for generations, and this tradition was maintained
when Africans were brought as slaves to the United States.38 Based
on their African oral musical traditions and enforced illiteracy under
U.S. slavery, enslaved Black people created and shared music almost exclusively through performance.39
31

See, e.g., DOUGLAS COHEN ET AL., MUSIC: ITS LANGUAGE, HISTORY, AND CULTURE 49–
50, 56–58 (2015) (describing the oral musical traditions of Africa and East Asia).
32
90 F. Supp. 904, 905, 910 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (noting that the original version was
recorded by Paula Watson, while the cover at issue was recorded by Evelyn Watson).
33
Id. at 906–08. Sound recordings were first granted federal copyright protection in the
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
34
Supreme Recs., 90 F. Supp. at 912.
35
Id. at 909, 911 (indicating that additions to a song were non-copyrightable
performance elements).
36
See Brauneis, supra note 11, at 19–22.
37
See Judith Becker, Is Western Art Music Superior?, 72 MUSICAL Q. 341, 350 (1986).
38
THOMAS E. LARSON, HISTORY AND TRADITION OF JAZZ 16–17 (5th ed. 2012).
39
See Hines, supra note 13, at 470.
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In many ways, the experiences and methods of creation by Black
artists—along with their under-inclusion in copyright law—can be
likened to those of Indigenous artists.40 Native American and Indigenous artwork, music, and traditional knowledge are also frequently
left outside the confines of intellectual property protection; this is
due to existing for millennia, lacking an identifiable author, and being created by multiple people or an entire community.41 Scholar
Trevor Reed explained that the unequal treatment of Indigenous creative works stems from the Copyright Act (1) requiring that works
be fixed; (2) requiring that they are original; and (3) not allowing
ideas to be protected.42 Indigenous cultures seldom physically record folklore or traditional knowledge.43 For example, Indigenous
traditional oral music in the United States and around the world
rarely manifests in written form.44 The resulting lack of protections
for Indigenous artists led to their exploitation by creative industries.45 For example, the Zulu tribesman who composed the famous
song from Disney’s The Lion King, “The Lion Sleeps Tonight,” was
merely paid a small amount and only received credit for writing the
song decades later.46 The Zulu composer was not alone; the low
40

See David E. Wilkins, African Americans and Aboriginal Peoples: Similarities and
Differences in Historical Experiences, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 515, 516–23 (2005) (describing
the broader similarities between the mistreatment and lower legal protections throughout
U.S. history for Black and Native American people).
41
See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 929, 957–58 (2002); see also Erin M. Genia, The Landscape and Language of
Indigenous Cultural Rights, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 653, 670 (2012) (“In general, [I]ndigenous
peoples’ worldviews hold communally owned property and stewardship as paramount.”);
Jill Koren Kelley, Owning the Sun: Can Native Culture Be Protected Through Current
Intellectual Property Law?, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 180, 180 (2007) (“[T]his Western concept
of a limited monopoly over a symbol, song or ceremony contradicts Native American
conceptions of cultural property and what it means to them and their existence both as a
sovereign community and as an individual.”).
42
Reed, supra note 3, at 1392–93.
43
See Farley, supra note 11, at 28–29.
44
See Mills, supra note 2, at 64–65 (“While it is traditional for Western music to be
reduced to a tangible, written or recorded memorialization, music from oral traditions is
rarely crystallized into fixed forms.”).
45
See Genia, supra note 41, at 669 (describing how cultural exploitation is facilitated,
in part because of intellectual property laws, as they are now, “are inadequate to deal with
concerns specific to Indigenous cultural rights . . . .”).
46
See David Browne, ‘The Lion Sleeps Tonight’: The Ongoing Saga of Pop’s Most
Contentious
Song,
ROLLING
STONE
(Nov.
7,
2019,
11:39
AM),
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degree of originality required for copyright allowed imitators of artistic styles to make windfalls while the progenitors of those styles
languished in obscurity since artistic style is not eligible for copyright protection.47 Several scholars and lawyers have tried to find a
place for Indigenous community cultural expressions and traditional
knowledge through specific intellectual property protections.48
However, problems with using copyright to protect Indigenous cultural heritage have persisted. Such oral forms of music creation were
directly at odds with U.S. copyright law’s requirement that music be
notated to receive protection.49

https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/lion-sleeps-tonight-lion-king-update879663 [https://perma.cc/K5YF-SV77].
47
See Greene, supra note 9, at 381, 383 (noting examples of progenitors of jazz dying
penniless).
48
See, e.g., Giovanna Carugano, How to Protect Traditional Folk Music? Some
Reflections upon Traditional Knowledge and Copyright Law, 31 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 261
(2018) (arguing for a place for traditional music within copyright law); Rosemary J.
Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Traditional Knowledge
in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275 (2001) (advocating for a specific
international law protecting traditional knowledge); Farley, supra note 11, at 2–3
(concluding that intellectual property, at present, can provide sufficient protection for those
Indigenous artists that want to disseminate their art, but not for Indigenous groups
preventing outside use of their art); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional
Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001) (describing the difficulties with
protecting traditional knowledge under existing copyright law and efforts by different
countries to address this shortcoming); Richard Awopetu, Note, In Defense of Culture:
Protecting Traditional Cultural Expression in Intellectual Property, 69 EMORY L.J. 745
(2020) (suggesting that U.S. federal trademark law prevent the registration of Indigenous
trademarks by non-Indigenous entities); Emily Choi, Safeguarding Native American
Traditional Knowledge Under Existing Legal Frameworks: Why and How Federal
Agencies Must Re-Interpret FOIA’s “Trade Secret Exemption,” ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
HIST. PRES. (2019), https://www.achp.gov/sites/default/files/2019-10/FOIA%20tribal%
20confidentiality%20paper%2010.21.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5W2-YP33] (advocating
for defining traditional Native knowledge as trade secrets under FOIA); Anil K. Gupta,
Rewarding Conservation of Biological and Genetic Resources and Associates Traditional
Knowledge and Contemporary Grassroots Creativity (Indian Inst. Mgmt., Working Paper
No. 2003-01-06, 2003), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Anil-Gupta-8/publication/
46436376_Rewarding_Conservation_of_Biological_and_Genetic_Resources_and_Assoc
iated_Traditional_Knowledge_and_Contemporary_Grassroots_Creativity/links/562dd8ba
08ae04c2aeb4ab0e/Rewarding-Conservation-of-Biological-and-Genetic-Resources-andAssociated-Traditional-Knowledge-and-Contemporary-Grassroots-Creativity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AT39-8EUJ] (describing the role of intellectual property rights for
benefit sharing with traditional communities).
49
See Hines, supra note 13, at 470.
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The fixation issue was not remedied by including sound recordings in the Copyright Act. Sound recordings have been protected
since 1972, but receive more narrow protections than other copyrightable works.50 The sound recording itself cannot be copied directly under copyright law, but anyone can freely imitate a sound
recording, provided there is not an underlying musical work with
copyright protection of its own.51 After 1978, phonorecords of
sound recordings could be used to meet the fixation requirement for
musical works.52 Fixation in a sound recording now qualifies for
musical work copyright registration, but only if the recording artist
and composer are the same person.53 However, this shift in the law
still requires fixation—neglecting songs that were neither written
nor recorded and merely sung or performed live.54
Improvisation is another non-Western musical practice not encompassed within U.S. copyright law. Improvising plays a central
role in a number of musical traditions. African music emphasizes
improvisation—with varying stanzas, melodies, and notes—instead
of written stasis.55 Stemming from these African musical traditions,
improvisation maintains an important and central role in Black music in the United States, from spirituals to hip hop.56 The various
musical styles that emerged from Black musical traditions, such as
jazz and blues, emphasize spontaneous—never written—improvisation.57 Indeed, blues music was traditionally not transcribed on sheet
50

17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording . . . do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”).
51
See Brauneis, supra note 11, at 21–22.
52
See id. at 22.
53
See id. (Under the 1976 Act, “musical works need not be fixed in visible notation, but
can be fixed in ‘phonorecords,’ that is, copies of sound recordings.”); U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., CIRCULAR 56A, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND
RECORDINGS
2
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XVP2-GRGQ].
54
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., MUSICAL WORKS, SOUND RECORDINGS & COPYRIGHT 2,
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/sound-recordings-vs-musical-works.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WH9L-ZP4M] (Feb. 2020) (noting that fixation is required for sound
recordings, such as in CDs or digital music files).
55
See Hines, supra note 13, at 472.
56
See id.
57
See id. at 478, 481.
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music at all, instead focusing on the musician’s ear and building off
common lyrics and musical forms.58 African and Black music are
not alone in utilizing improvisation. For instance, Middle Eastern
music emphasizes melodic, improvised solos (called “taqsims”) and
ornamentations.59 Indian classical music is also heavily based on unwritten improvisation.60
Despite the broad importance of improvisation across global
musical traditions, it is not protected under, and even maligned by
U.S. copyright law. Improvisation, as a spontaneous and live performance, does not meet the fixation requirement for copyright. In addition, improvisation from set melodies is at odds with copyright’s
understanding of derivative works. A derivative work is a work
“based upon one or more preexisting works . . . in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted.”61 Thus, arrangements or covers
of copyrighted musical works qualify as derivatives and receive
copyright protection.62 However, derivative works can only be authored by the copyright holder (i.e., the composer), as it is one of the
copyright holder’s exclusive rights.63 Unlike other exclusive rights
conferred upon the owner of a copyrighted musical work, there is no

58

See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright,
27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 596 (2010).
59
See JOHNNY FARRAJ & SAMI ABU SHUMAYS, INSIDE ARABIC MUSIC: ARABIC MAQAM
PERFORMANCE AND THEORY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 76–77 (2019) (“One of the most
recognizable and distinguishing features of Arabic music is ornamentation (zakhrafa in
Arabic): the art of taking a plain melody and embellishing it.”); Bashir Saade, East Meets
East—A Shakuhachi and Nay Duo, MIDDLE E. INST. (Sept. 16, 2013),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/east-meets-east-shakuhachi-and-nay-duo
[https://perma.cc/D3PQ-NNLY]; see also Marie Irene Heinrich, The Dastgāh Concept in
Contemporary Iranian Art Music: Navigating Interculturalism in Reza Vali’s Kismet for
Flute Trio 4 (Dec. 1, 2017) (Doctoral dissertation, Griffith University), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280534 [https://perma.cc/HL2A-WT77]
(describing the importance of improvisation in Persian music, but noting that Western
classical musicians typically do not improvise).
60
NEIL SORRELL & RAM NARAYAN, INDIAN MUSIC IN PERFORMANCE: A PRACTICAL
INTRODUCTION 1–2, 4 (1980) (describing the importance of improvisation in North Indian
music, and how this improvisation is done inside the systems of rag and tal, and how South
Indian music, in comparison, tends to have less scope for improvisation).
61
17 U.S.C. § 101.
62
17 U.S.C. § 103.
63
17 U.S.C. § 106(2); see also Arewa, supra note 58, at 598; Brauneis, supra note 11,
at 24; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 53, at 2.
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compulsory license for derivative works.64 This allows the holder of
a copyright in a musical work to refuse or condition the creation of
a derivative work on unequal or even unconscionable terms, such as
requiring the performer to sign over all rights in the derivative
work.65
Related to the derivative work problem, a new issue has emerged
since the inclusion of sound recordings in the Copyright Act of
1976: sampling—”the act of taking a portion of one sound recording
and reusing it as an instrument or an audio recording in a different
song or piece.”66 For example, the modern genres of hip hop and rap
both depend heavily on sampling for musical expression.67 Yet,
sampling was quickly blocked by the courts. In Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, the Southern District of New
York held that Biz Markie’s rap song “Alone Again” impermissibly
sampled a portion from Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again (Naturally).”68 The Court held—devastatingly for genres like rap—that
sampling without permission from the original copyright owner constituted blatant copyright infringement.69 Obtaining licenses for
every sample presented a significant logistical and financial burden
64

See Michael P. Goodyear, Synchronizing Copyright and Technology: A New
Paradigm for Sync Rights, 87 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 15) (on file
with author) (explaining how compulsory licenses exist only for the reproduction and
distribution of music works, but not other rights).
65
See Brauneis, supra note 11, at 24.
66
The Ultimate Guide to Digital Sampling, SOUNDBRIDGE (June 10, 2019),
https://soundbridge.io/digital-sampling [https://perma.cc/PB7S-AJ5S].
67
See Hines, supra note 13, at 488; see also generally Andrew Bartlett, Airshafts,
Loudspeakers, and the Hip Hop Sample: Contexts and African American Musical
Aesthetics, 28 AFR. AM. REV. 639 (1994) (discussing the context and importance of
sampling in hip hop and rap).
68
780 F. Supp. 182, 183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
69
Id. It should be noted, however, that there is a circuit split over whether sampling is
per se copyright infringement. In addition to the court in Grand Upright Music, the Sixth
Circuit also held that all sampling is per se copyright infringement, as sampling requires
willful copying. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02 (6th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting a de minimis defense for sampling). The Ninth Circuit explicitly
rejected the holding in Bridgeport, however, holding that the de minimis rule applied for
sampling. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880, 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that a three-horn hit was not infringement because it was a de minimis use). A de
minimis defense alone, however, only allows minimal borrowing of a sound recording,
such as the single three-horn hit in VMG Salsoul, which is far less than the borrowing
usually necessary for forms of expression such as rap.
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for rap artists.70 And unlike other parts of music copyright, there is
no compulsory license for sampling (i.e., reproducing the sound recording); it is instead up to the copyright owner’s discretion whether
to license the work or not, and to name the price.71 This forced rap
artists to change how they create music or risk copyright sanctions.72
Indeed, the challenges posed by copyright to Black artists have led
many to alter their creativity or leave music entirely.73
A third way in which U.S. copyright law has not equally protected racial minorities’ creative works is in requiring a known, recently alive author to gain copyright protection.74 Many centuriesold, traditional Indigenous and non-Western songs and arts have
communal or unknown creators.75 U.S. copyright law requires a
known author and only protects works for a limited period of time,
leaving these important but ancient works in the public domain.76
While such works remain unprotected, others can exploit traditional
music and arts for their own profit without worrying about copyright
infringement claims.77 This facilitates the free commercial repurposing of Indigenous cultural symbols and practices.78 U.S. copyright
law defines creative arts as endeavors that are at least partially about
making a profit,79 but this commercial approach is at odds with other
70

See Hines, supra note 13, at 490 (“The process was lengthy; on the eve of his album
release, an artist might still be awaiting permission to use a sample.”).
71
See id.; see also Brauneis, supra note 11, at 24.
72
See Hines, supra note 13, at 491 (noting, for example, that the protection of sound
recordings from sampling “destroyed the creative sampling styles of rap groups such as
Public Enemy, who distinguished themselves as a rap group via their clever use of hundreds
of indecipherable samples in their songs.”).
73
See id. at 491–92 (remarking that the copyright regime “punishes those who push
musical artistry to new levels.”).
74
See Greene, supra note 9, at 354–61.
75
See Mills, supra note 2, at 63 (“In many non-Western or traditional communities,
music is passed through generations, owned ‘temporarily’ by certain individuals or
groups.”).
76
See id. at 62–63.
77
See id. at 59–60 (noting that the “market for non-Western sounds . . . provides . . .
artists and companies [an incentive] to exploit the lack of legal protection for non-Western
music.”); Bachner, supra note 11, at 1 (arguing that the United States “consider[s]
traditional music to be part of the public domain.”).
78
See Dan Burk, Copyright, Culture, and Community in Virtual Worlds, 5 LAWS 1, 9
(2016).
79
See Twentieth Century Music Co. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
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artistic traditions. For example, Indigenous and non-Western societies around the globe value music as integral to their communities’
culture, and for non-commercial purposes such as medicine.80 The
commercial appropriation of Indigenous cultural expression can be
especially harmful due to the spiritual or sacred nature of these
works.81 Thus, in these three ways, copyright law’s structure poorly
serves living musical traditions.82
In response to the inequality perpetrated by Western copyright
laws, other countries have started providing more robust copyright
protections for diverse and Indigenous creative arts. In Senegal, for
example, the government passed legislation specifically protecting
folklore from unauthorized use in 1973, requiring royalty payments
when using folklore works.83 Meanwhile, Qatar protects national
folklore and assigns authorship to the state to prevent improper use
or commercial exploitation of traditional works.84 In Brazil, copyright law specifically provides protection for performers, including
those performing folklore expressions.85 Azerbaijan does not protect

labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic activity for the general
public good.”). More recent studies have suggested that the incentive-driven structure of
copyright does not necessarily make sense for encouraging creativity. See, e.g., David A.
Simon, Culture, Creativity, & Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 283 (2011)
(suggesting “culture is composed of entities that replicate for their own sake.”).
80
See Mills, supra note 2, at 57, 62. For example, the Pintupi in Australia use music for
war, youth initiation, and healing. See id. at 62.
81
See, e.g., Kremers, supra note 13, at 108 n.619; Reed, supra note 3, at 1384–88.
Trademarks that use Native American tribes’ names or imagery are also allowed, especially
after the Supreme Court rulings in Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti that § 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, prohibiting disparaging, immoral, or scandalous marks, was unconstitutional.
See Anthony J. McShane & Andrea Stein Fuelleman, The Trademarks THE SLANTS,
REDSKINS, and Now FUCT Are Registrable Trademarks Following the Supreme Court’s
Iancu v. Brunetti Ruling, 31 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2019) (noting that the mark
“REDSKINS,” previously found to be unregistrable by a court, was reinstated following
Tam).
82
See Arewa, supra note 58, at 602.
83
Law No. 2008-09 of January 25, 2008 on Copyright and Neighboring Rights in
Senegal, arts. 156–57 (Sen.), https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sn/
sn004en.html [https://perma.cc/H9AN-VB4A]; see also Mills, supra note 2, at 71–72.
84
Law No. 7 of 2002 on the Protection of Copyright and Related Rights, arts. 1, 32
(Qatar), https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/129460 [https://perma.cc/59DX-EEMF].
85
Lei No. 9.610, de 19 de Fevereiro de 1998, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de
20.2.1998 (Braz.), https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/490948 [https://perma.cc/MN7XHAZ4].
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works of folklore under copyright, but instead protects these works
under a separate law entirely.86 Similarly, Ethiopia includes tangible
and intangible cultural heritage under its cultural heritage protection
law, which prevents uses of traditional artistic expressions and
works that impair their historical, scientific, or artistic value.87 Many
other countries at least acknowledge the special position of traditional knowledge under copyright and patent law, if not provide active protection for it.88
In stark contrast, U.S. copyright law and international copyright
laws89 have generally failed to provide protections for traditional
and non-Western forms of cultural expression. The very limited exceptions are for Native American works, which are somewhat protected under false advertising and trademark law, but not copyright
law.90 The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 prohibits misrepresentation of goods as Native American or Alaska Native goods.91
Alaska has adopted a similar Alaska Native handicraft certification
program.92 Under its power to investigate unfair trade practices, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has investigated cases of companies falsely claiming a good is made by Native American

86

Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On Legal Protection of Azerbaijani Folklore
Expressions” (as amended up to Law No. 638-IVQD of April 30, 2013) (Azer.),
https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/az/az101en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST88-2JFF].
87
Proclamation No. 209/2000 Research and Conservation of Cultural Heritage
Proclamation, June 27, 2000, art. 22 (Eth.), https://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/
tklaws/articles/article_0047.html [https://perma.cc/7VCM-EK3K].
88
See Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions & Genetic Resources
Laws, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/tklaws [https://
perma.cc/B7J8-U8J9] (listing 167 intellectual property laws worldwide that address
traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expression, and genetic resources).
89
See Macmillan, supra note 4, at 415–24 (arguing that the World Trade Organization
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) has
restricted cultural diversity by exacerbating the negative effects of Western copyright law
upon cultural diversity); see also Mills, supra note 2, at 75–78.
90
The United States has acknowledged and passed laws addressing the poor fit of
intellectual property for protecting Native American traditional knowledge. See Kremers,
supra note 13, at 72–92.
91
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305(e); see also Kremers, supra note
13, at 72–81.
92
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.65.010–45.65.070 (West 2015); see also Kremers, supra
note 13, at 81–85.
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people.93 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) also created a Database of Native American Tribal Insignia as a reference tool of official tribal insignia for trademark examiners to deny trademarks falsely suggesting a connection with
Native American tribes.94 While these initiatives are a worthy
start,95 they focus on unfair competition and trademark law, leaving
the poor protection for Native American works under U.S. copyright
law untouched.96
II. CULTURAL ADAPTATION AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
Given the shortcomings of U.S. copyright law in protecting racial minorities’ creative expressions, how can copyright be better
attuned to more equitably protect artistic works? One possibility is
to consider cultural adaptation. Cultural adaptation is important to
addressing the culture-based consumption model and responding to
the high influence that cultural context has in marketing a work,
even as cultures continue to meld and overlap. But cultural adaptations could be blocked under copyright law as derivative works.97
As mentioned above, the definition of “culture” used in this Article is the U.S.-centric understanding of culture98—defined as a
unique form of expression that is produced, consumed, and

93

15 U.S.C. § 45(a); Kremers, supra note 13, at 86.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., Native American Tribal Insignia,
www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-regulations/native-american-tribal-insignia
[https://perma.cc/2FSB-JTY4]. Note, however, that the USPTO does allow non-infringing
marks that can be derogatory toward Native American people, such as the Washington
Redskins football team. See generally McShane & Fuelleman, supra note 81 (describing
the state of Native American-related trademarks such as “REDSKINS” after Tam and
Brunetti).
95
These initiatives, however, are not without controversy. See Kremers, supra note 13,
at 72–92 (examining the shortcomings of each of these laws).
96
See Dr. Jane Anderson, Indigenous/Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property 1
(Issues Paper, Duke Univ. Sch. of L. Ctr. for Study of Pub. Domain, 2010) (explaining how
existing copyright laws leave Indigenous culture vulnerable to appropriation); Reed, supra
note 3, at 1377–78 (noting that there are “no federal laws other than copyright that prohibit
the appropriation of Indigenous songs, dances, or other forms of Indigenous cultural
expression.”).
97
17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting the right to create derivative works to the copyright holder
as an exclusive right).
98
See Napoli, supra note 7, at 167.
94
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recreated by a particular social group, which, for the purposes of this
Article, is a racial or ethnic social group. The definitions and understandings of culture have developed in significant ways over the past
century and a half.99 While one authoritative definition of culture is
still elusive,100 modern definitions have started to coalesce around
certain themes. One recent linguistic understanding of culture, for
example, defines it as:
A complex set of meaning systems that consists of
patterns of traditions, beliefs, values, schemas,
norms, and symbols, that are shared to varying degrees by interacting members of a social group and
that influence (but do not determine) each member’s
behaviour and his/her interpretations of the “meaning” of other people’s behaviour.101
This and other modern definitions of culture highlight the plurality and worth of culture, that culture is not immutable, and that
membership in a social group influences one’s behaviors and values,
but is not the sole, or even necessarily primary, determinant.102
While the history of culture and race is complicated and problematic,103 race and ethnic groups are still seen as important cultural
groups and influences on one’s culture.104
For the purposes of this Article, cultural adaptation is defined as
adapting preexisting works to reflect the cultural and social mores
and norms of a group and to speak to that specific group as an

99

See generally Tony Bennett, Cultural Studies and the Culture Concept, 29 CULTURAL
STUD. 546 (2015) (discussing different definitions of culture from the mid-nineteenth to
the early twentieth centuries).
100 See ARNOLD GROH, THEORIES OF CULTURE 5 (2019) (“The concept of culture is wide
and fuzzy, and theories of culture are even more innumerable . . . none of them can fully
claim to have attained the final definition of culture.”).
101 H
ELEN SPENCER-OATEY & DÁNIEL Z. KÁDÁR, INTERCULTURAL POLITENESS:
MANAGING RELATIONS ACROSS CULTURES 4 (2021).
102 See id.
103
See, Charles Hirschman, The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race, 30
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 385, 393–94 (2004) (describing nineteenth century Social
Darwinism, eugenics, and understanding of cultures in relation to race).
104 Haney López, supra note 19, at 18 (“[T]here is a significant overlap between race and
culture, or in my formulation, community.”).
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audience.105 In other words, cultural adaptation is modifying a work
aimed at one culture to address another. Artists can remake and recontextualize existing works for a different cultural audience.106 For
example, a film aimed toward the average U.S. moviegoer could be
reformulated by adding Indian motifs, themes, and norms, to appeal
to a Bollywood moviegoer, someone for whom the original U.S. cultural work might have little appeal.107
Cultural adaptations can appeal to different markets due to the
importance of culture on consumption. Though someone’s race or
ethnicity does not dictate their tastes,108 it can still have an important
influence on them.109 One of the most common examples is food
consumption. Taste is not solely a physiological experience, but is
strongly influenced by cultural stimuli, such as the geographical, political, and historical context in which one is raised and to which one
is exposed.110 For example, spicy food is indispensable to Korean
cuisine, yet only 10.5% of Americans consume any kind of pepper
on a daily basis; many Americans may have a much lower tolerance

105

See Goodyear, supra note 16, at 521 (“‘Indian cultural adaptation’ is defined as adding
Indian elements to preexisting expression to create a new film specifically for Indian
audiences.”).
106
See Pager, supra note 4, at 403.
107 See Goodyear, supra note 16, at 541–42.
108 See Winfried Lüdemann, Why Culture, Not Race, Determines Tastes in Music,
CONVERSATION (Sept. 3, 2015, 12:42 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-culture-notrace-determines-tastes-in-music-46639
[https://perma.cc/Q8FZ-NSM2]
(“[These
differences in taste] are the result of any number of contributing factors, including
upbringing in the parent culture, education, peer-group interaction, expression of a person’s
individual identity, even a marker of territory.”).
109 See Mary-Jon Ludy & Richard D. Mattes, Comparison of Sensory, Physiological,
Personality, and Cultural Traits in Regular Spicy Food Users and Non-Users, 58 APPETITE
19, 19 (2012).
110 See Susanne Højlund, Taste as a Social Sense: Rethinking Taste as a Cultural Activity,
4 FLAVOUR, no. 6, 2015, at 2, https://flavourjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/
10.1186/2044-7248-4-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQR-8P63].
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for spice in general.111 While such preferences can be attributed to a
variety of factors, culture is frequently a significant one.112
Yet cultural differences in taste are not limited to food. Musical
tastes are primarily dictated by the cultural influences to which people are exposed,113 and thus, are often shaped by one’s racial or ethnic group. However, musical preferences are not exclusively shaped
by this identity nor do all members of the group have the same tastes
and preferences.114 For example, one study at the University of Mississippi found that a large percentage of the music Black individuals
listen to tends to consist of rap, R&B, and gospel music—genres
typically associated with Black artists and culture—while white individuals listen to these genres much less frequently.115 Another
study found that Black college students preferred music created by
those of the same cultural background.116 A third study found that
stronger identification with one’s race increases the likelihood of
that individual preferring music created by artists of the same race
or background.117

111

See Ludy & Mattes, supra note 109, at 19. The stereotype of white Americans being
unable to handle spicy food is pervasive in society. See, Nick Rose, Why ‘White’ Is the
Least-Spicy Option at this Korean Restaurant, VICE (Jan. 17, 2017, 5:00 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/d7kv7j/why-white-is-the-least-spicy-option-at-thiskorean-restaurant [https://perma.cc/2WU9-Z9SJ].
112 See Ludy & Mattes, supra note 109, at 25 (“[T]hese findings indicate that culture may
be more important that [sic] physiological sensitivity in driving the desire to consume spicy
foods.”).
113 See Jacqueline Howard, Where Your Taste in Music Comes From, CNN (Apr. 12,
2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/10/health/where-taste-in-music-comesfrom/index.html [https://perma.cc/QK4F-P9EJ].
114
See John Sonnett, Musical Relationships: Intersections of Race, Gender, Genre, and
Listening Situation, 15 CULTURAL SOCIO. 44, 54–63 (2021) (presenting data showing music
listening patterns of artists of different races based on listener race and gender); Julian
Schaap & Pauwke Berkers, “Maybe It’s . . . Skin Colour?” How Race-Ethnicity and
Gender Function in Consumers’ Formation of Classification Styles of Cultural Content,
23 CONSUMPTION MKTS. & CULTURE 599, 611 (2020) (finding in a study that “gender and
race-ethnicity matter in the classification of rock music, even (or particularly) when the
salience of race-ethnicity and/or gender is rejected discursively.”).
115 Sonnett, supra note 114, at 56 (the percentage of consumption for R&B and Gospel
were particularly low for white consumers).
116 Jan McCrary, Effects of Listeners’ and Performers’ Race on Music Preferences, 41 J.
RSCH. MUSIC EDUC. 200, 206 (1993).
117 Shantal R. Marshall & Laura P. Naumann, What’s Your Favorite Music? Music
Preferences Cue Racial Identity, 76 J. RSCH. PERSONALITY 74, 74 (2018).
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Indeed, there are identifiable consumption models based on race
and culture across artistic media. For example, a survey evaluating
music genre tastes showed that Black consumers identified rap, hip
hop, R&B, jazz, gospel, soul, and reggae as being representative of
the United States more than other consumers did.118 The same survey also showed that Latinx consumers identified Latin music more
than other consumers.119 Similar race-influenced consumption models have been observed in studies on race, culture, and movie preferences in the United States.120 For example, Black adolescent consumers prefer television shows that exhibit more racial diversity,
particularly shows with Black characters.121
It is critical to understand these cultural preferences to create a
work that appeals to a given consumer base. Popular, non-white directors have incorporated aspects of their own cultures into their
movies to reach like-minded audiences.122 In India, films have distinctly Indian norms and mores.123 A cultural disconnect between
118

Public Opinion on the Music Genres Which Are Representative of America Today in
the United States as of May 2018, by Ethnicity, STATISTICA (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/864610/music-genre-modern-america-ethnicity.
[https://perma.cc/6T2L-TB2Y].
119
Id.
120 See Maryann Erigha, Do African Americans Direct Science Fiction or Blockbuster
Franchise Movies? Race, Genre, and Contemporary Hollywood, 47 J. BLACK STUD. 550,
562 (2016) (“The assumption that [w]hite audiences, who are the imagined target of most
mainstream American popular culture productions, might not patronize Black work outside
of stereotypical genres would lead to studio executives privileging the desires of [w]hite
audiences. . . . “) (internal citations omitted); Kaden Lee, Race in Hollywood: Quantifying
the Effect of Race on Movie Performance, BROWN UNIV. 1, 6–7 (Dec. 20, 2014),
https://blogs.brown.edu/econ-1400-s01/files/2015/01/ECON1400_KadenLee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6S9T-GMY4] (“[D]istribution [of Tyler Perry movies] may have been
targeted to [Black] communities where they would be well-received.”).
121 See Morgan E. Ellithorpe & Amy Bleakley, Wanting to See People Like Me? Racial
and Gender Diversity in Popular Adolescent Television, 45 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE
1426, 1434–35 (2016).
122
See, e.g., Greg Braxton, Tyler Perry Studios, the House ‘Madea’ Built, Becomes a
Landmark for Black Hollywood, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/tv/story/2019-10-02/tyler-perry-studiosatlanta-dedication [https://perma.cc/M9E2-7SSF] (describing the importance of Black
culture in Tyler Perry’s works and for his primarily Black audience).
123 See Ramola Talwar Badam, Is Bollywood a Hollywood Clone?, CBS NEWS (June 4,
2003, 5:05 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-bollywood-a-hollywood-clone
[https://perma.cc/J285-QK9S] (“When you take an idea and route it through the Indian
heart, it changes entirely.”).
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the film and the audience can make movies complete failures at the
box office.124 For example, Hollywood films frequently fail to engage Latinx moviegoers—not to mention the poor representation of
Latinx people in Hollywood, both behind the camera and on
screen.125 But films that directly engage the Latinx community are
often well-received.126 Thus, marketing a work to the cultural audience with which it will resonate may be critical to its success or failure.
However, while such cultural consumption remains tied to race,
increasingly, these barriers are being broken down. For example, the
number of non-Latinx consumers of Latin music has skyrocketed
over the past few years, with performers like Bad Bunny and J Balvin leading the new wave of mainstream Latin music in the United
States.127 This is, in part, due to minority artists trying to reach a
broader audience.128 Perhaps the most important aspect, however, is
the increase in consumers exposed to different cultural forms of

124

See Goodyear, supra note 16, at Part V(D) (describing how U.S. films in India have
spectacularly failed when they ignored Indian movie norms and culture).
125 See generally Stacy L. Smith et al., Latinos in Film: Erasure on Screen & Behind the
Camera Across 1,200 Popular Movies, UNIV. S. CAL. ANNENBERG (2019),
http://assets.uscannenberg.org/docs/aii-study-latinos-in-film-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5T8P-RD2N] (comprising a report on the representation of Latinx people
in film); Patrick Ryan, Where Are the Movies for Hispanic Audiences?, USA TODAY (May
3, 2017, 8:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2017/05/03/how-to-be-alatin-lover-hispanic-moviegoers-underrepresented/100699460 [https://perma.cc/PV4VZANT] (explaining the lack of Latinx-focused movies in Hollywood); Alonso Duralde,
Why Are So Many Films for Latinos Bad?, SALON (Jan. 28, 2011, 3:01 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2011/01/28/from_prada_to_nada_latino_film
[https://perma.cc/W6VB-Z9BG] (complaining about the lack of good Latinx-focused
movies by Hollywood).
126 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 125 (describing the success of Eugenio Derbez’s How to
Be a Latin Lover, which drew an audience that was eighty-nine percent Latinx).
127 See, e.g., Nicole Acevedo, More People in the U.S. Are Listening to Latin Music
Albums, Surpassing Country, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:03 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/more-people-u-s-are-listening-latin-musicalbums-surpassing-n954831 [https://perma.cc/U63P-UR72].
128 See, e.g., Tambay Obenson, Tyler Perry Has a White Audience Problem He’d Like to
Solve, SHADOW & ACT (Oct. 25, 2016), https://shadowandact.com/tyler-perrys-talks-hiswhite-audience-problem [https://perma.cc/74CW-XG25] (describing some of Tyler
Perry’s efforts to reach white consumers in addition to his Black audience base).
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expression, especially in large cities and other areas with a high concentration of diversity.129
Based on these cultural consumption markets, cultural adaptation can beneficially expand works intended for one cultural audience to another. In the United States, this typically flows in one direction.130 Legal scholar K.J. Greene found that cultural appropriation in the arts is primarily characterized by white businesses and
artists benefitting at the expense of minority artists.131 Examples
abound, such as Urban Outfitters launching a Navajo-themed clothing and accessory line and French designer Isabel Marant creating a
line accused of copying the Tlahuitoltepec blouse of the Indigenous
Mixe community in Mexico.132 Copyright law provides little protection for minorities against this exploitation.133 U.S. copyright law
insufficiently protects music created by Black artists, allowing both
the appropriation of Black works and the unconscionable transfer of
rights by those with a poorer understanding of the law.134 There has
also been longstanding appropriation of Native American culture by
white people for generations,135 which some scholars have compared to the broader taking of “all things Indian for others’ use.”136
Such adaptation of Native American culture has been perpetrated
129

See Tom Vanderbilt, The Secret of Taste: Why We Like What We Like, GUARDIAN
(June 22, 2016, 1:00 AM), theguardian.com/science/2016/jun/22/secret-of-taste-why-welike-what-we-like [https://perma.cc/X46R-6TEE] (describing how our tastes change over
time, based, in part, on exposure to new and different perspectives and stimuli).
130
See generally Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Copyright’s One-Way Racial Appropriation
Ratchet, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (2019) (establishing and discussing the problem of
one-way appropriation of minority cultural creations by dominant ones).
131 Greene, supra note 9, at 368 (citing the example of the cultural appropriation of works
by Black blues artists).
132 See Amber Lee, Homage or Faux Pas: Cultural Appropriation in Fashion Apparel,
CTR. FOR ART L. (June 29, 2020), https://itsartlaw.org/2020/06/29/homage-or-faux-pascultural-appropriation-in-fashion-apparel [https://perma.cc/U6VU-S4MA] (providing
examples of possible cultural appropriation in the fashion industry); see also Navajo Nation
v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1161–69 (D.N.M. 2013).
133 See Greene, supra note 9, at 368–69 (citing the example of white mirror covers of
music created by Black artists).
134 See id. at 372–73.
135
See generally PHILIP J. DELORIA, PLAYING INDIAN (1998) (documenting different ways
in which white settlers have relied on and borrowed Native American culture to create a
national identity).
136 Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural)
Appropriation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 859, 866 (2016).
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without permission and is often controversial.137 Yet cultural adaptation can flow the other way, allowing minority artists to borrow
from works made primarily for white audiences and transform them
to appeal to their own cultural audiences. This promotes more creative works authored by minority artists—similar to the way white
artists draw on works by artists of color.138
However, these cultural copies may constitute derivative works
that infringe copyrights in the existing works.139 First, courts have
interpreted what qualifies as a derivative work rather broadly.140 In
addition, any derivative work that violates the copyright owner’s exclusive right is not eligible for copyright protection.141 This reinforces a belief that unauthorized derivative works are unvaluable to
society if they are similar enough to the original to affect the original’s market.142 Cultural adaptation appears to be stymied by exclusive derivate work rights, but cultural adaptations could be permissible under an exception to the exclusive rights: fair use.143
III. THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT: CREATION VS. PROFIT
Before examining the standing of cultural adaptations under fair
use, it is essential to understand the purpose of copyright. The Intellectual Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution states the purpose
of copyright protection (and protection for other forms of
137

Reed, supra note 3, at 1375–77 (describing differing Native American views on
cultural adaptation and how copyright law fails to protect Native American culture from
such appropriation).
138 See Greene, supra note 9, at 372–73 (describing how white artists capitalized on Black
creations through the mirror cover phenomenon).
139 See Rachana Desai, Copyright Infringement in the Indian Film Industry, 7 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 259, 267–68 (2005) (discussing how the Indian film industry frequently
uses U.S. films as inspiration and how this can often be classified as an infringement of the
U.S. copyright owner’s derivate works right under the Copyright Act).
140
See Patrick R. Goold, Why the U.K. Adaptation Right Is Superior to the U.S.
Derivative Work Right, 92 NEB. L. REV. 843, 844–45 (2014) (describing the myriad cases
in which courts have defined works as derivative).
141 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been
used unlawfully.”).
142 See Hariqbal Basi, Indianizing Hollywood: The Debate Over Copyright Infringement
by Bollywood, 18 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 33, 40 (2011).
143 See infra Part IV(C).
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intellectual property) is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”144
Courts have interpreted the clause to encourage the creation and distribution of creative works.145 Melville Nimmer, one of the leading
authorities on copyright law, deduced that the “primary purpose of
copyright [i]s not to reward authors,” but to promote creation.146 Indeed, the purpose of creating new works has been the goal of copyright since the British Statute of Anne in the early eighteenth century
through present day.147
While copyright’s purported goal is to foster a greater effusion
of creativity,148 its efficacy to do so is debatable.149 For example,

144

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (acknowledging
that “dissemination of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act”); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce
their works, they are given an incentive to create . . . .”).
146
MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1–8 (2021). See also
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts.”).
147 JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 24–25 (4th ed.
2015) (“[T]he Statute of Anne was expressly meant to be, as its title stated, ‘[a]n act for the
encouragement of learning.’”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against
Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 747 (2013) (“[C]opyright law is thought to
incentivize the very production of that expression.”).
148
See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228–29 (stating that the purpose of copyright is to create and
distribute creative works); Malla Pollock, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?:
Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 809 (2001) (finding that “progress”
in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution refers to spreading knowledge and
technology).
149 See L
AWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 10–15 (2008) (arguing that limiting secondary works, especially in the internet
age, particularly chills the creation of new works); William Patry, The Failure of the
American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 909
(1997) (arguing that copyright primarily benefits industry distributors such as publishers
and record labels rather than artists). But see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 212 (2003) (arguing that
more copyright means more creative production); Robert P. Merges, The Concept of
145
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copyright can encourage creativity for popular and marketable artists while discouraging market entry for lesser-known artists.150 This
can lead to the latter producing fewer works, or even leaving the arts
entirely. Industries that profit in lieu of individual artists are especially problematic in terms of equity, given that content industries
are underinclusive of women and minorities.151 Even if copyright
leads to the creation of more works, this does not necessarily translate to more works that reflect the population’s cultural diversity.152
An especially insidious side effect of overly strong copyright
protection is that it can discourage secondary creations by inhibiting
artists from building on prior works.153 Copyright’s chilling effect
on secondary creation, for example, may particularly affect minority
artists who seek to repurpose mainstream or dominant cultural media for their own artistic aims and markets.154 This, in turn, limits
minority artists and reduces the number of diverse works created.
In practice, copyright has traditionally been about artists creating for profit. However, as law and culture scholar Madhavi Sunder
advocated in a 2006 Stanford Law Review article, it could instead
incorporate a cultural approach that acknowledges and furthers how
Property in the Digital Age, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1239, 1263–66 (2008) (arguing that artists
will invest more time in their work if it is protected by copyright).
150 See Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The
Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 790 (2004) (asserting that
“protection against unauthorized copying provides dramatically disproportionate benefits
to the most popular creations: it enables the publishers seeking to create blockbusters to
finance enormous promotional campaigns, which drown out valuable, artistic creations that
lack competitive marketing efforts.”); Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing
Restriction on Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity
Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1091–98 (2003) (describing how the dominance of
the industrial corporate media model of copyright creates significant barriers to
independent producers and creators); Neil W. Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright
in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1917 (2000) (“[C]onglomerate
content providers reap the lion’s share of the copyright benefit and others bear most of the
copyright burden.”).
151 See Netanel, supra note 150, at 1884 (stating that commercial media “neither
encompasses a wide, representative spectrum of viewpoint[s] nor carries the voices of
diverse and antagonistic sources.”).
152
See Pager, supra note 4, at 401.
153 See id.
154 See Rebecca Tushnet, Free to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint, 128 HARV.
L. REV. F. 125, 133–34 (2015) (discussing the socioeconomic, racial, and gender groups
who benefit less from copyright at present).
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different cultural perspectives can and do work together and influence each other to create new works.155 Sunder’s idea is in line with
copyright law’s approach to different groups more broadly, as U.S.
copyright law recognizes the unique needs of different populations
and explicitly contains carve outs for at least some of those groups.
For example, Sections 121 and 121A of the Copyright Act allow for
the lawful reproduction of copyrighted works in accessible formats
for the blind and visually impaired.156 However, Sunder left unanswered the question of how to facilitate inter- and intra-cultural borrowing in a socially just manner that facilitates equitable social exchange between cultural groups.157 Allowing at least a degree of cultural adaptation under fair use could provide one solution to allow
cultural borrowing.
Some scholars note that the fair use analysis should—and often
does—consider whether the use benefits the public interest, much
like how Sections 121 and 121A benefit the visually impaired.158
Even the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. suggested there is a role for public interest considerations, stating that
even when a work is not transformative, “there may be a strong public interest in the publication of . . . secondary work[s].”159 Although
the United States is not a signatory,160 the vast majority of countries

Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 324 (2006) (suggesting “that concerns
ranging from the compulsion to represent oneself historically (within and against
community) to a commitment to preserve and share cultural knowledge spur individuals
and communities to participate in creative industry.”).
156
17 U.S.C. §§ 121, 121A.
157 See Sunder, supra note 155, at 324, 328–29 (noting that a “central concern of a cultural
approach to intellectual property should be how to facilitate cultural production” in such a
way).
158 See Christine Steiner, Intellectual Property and the Right to Culture, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9–10 (WIPO ed., 1998), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/tk/en/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46FE-9MVG] (“The four-part test contained in copyright law is not the
only measure of fair use; courts look to other factors as well. For example, it is relevant
whether the taking is socially desirable or creative conduct that stimulates the public
interest.”); see also Amanda Reid, Deciding Fair Use, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 601, 612
(2019) (asserting the public interest inherent in fair use).
159 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132, 1134 (1990)).
160 See Country Profiles, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/creativity/countries?member_
parties=1 [https://perma.cc/9JF6-8MY5].
155
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have signed onto the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (“Diversity Convention”).161 This makes cultural diversity, if not a customary international norm, at least a goal that the majority of the world agrees is
worth advancing.162 The Diversity Convention requires that State
Parties “formulate and implement their cultural policies and . . .
adopt measures to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions.”163 Therefore, promotion of cultural diversity within the
United States would align with international norms. Diversity is also
an important goal in domestic policy—especially in the arts—to include valuable underrepresented perspectives and improve opportunities and well-being for racial minority communities.164
While Congress could amend the Copyright Act to expressly establish carve outs for uses of works by different cultural groups to
promote more creativity, courts already can account for culture
when determining the legality of uses of copyrighted works under
fair use.165 If public interest is to be considered when making fair
use determinations, courts should acknowledge both the purpose of
copyright—primarily the creation and distribution of new works rather than generating profits—and the benefits of having more diverse works of art. These two aims should color fair use analyses

161

See id. (151 parties, including the European Union, have signed the Convention).
See Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law, 118 MICH. L.
REV. 1487, 1490 (2020) (describing how a normative position is considered customary
international law if enough states support it in their practice and law).
163 The 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, supra note 5, art. 5.
164 Jason VanAlstine et al., Cultural Diversity in the United States and Its Impact on
Human Development, 18 J. IND. ACAD. SOC. SCIS. 125, 140 (2015) (concluding that
increased diversity correlates with net positive human development, including health,
education, and income); Sherylynn Sealy, Diversity and Inclusion in Arts and Culture,
N.Y. UNIV. J. POL. INQUIRY (Sept. 18, 2017), https://jpinyu.com/2017/09/18/diversity-andinclusion-in-arts-and-culture/ [https://perma.cc/7VBV-NLSF] (discussing the benefits of
diversity and inclusion in the arts in particular); Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca,
Diversity in the Legal Profession: Perspectives from Managing Partners and General
Counsel, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2483, 2486–87 (2015) (describing interviews with law firms
in which the firms cited diversity as the “right thing to do” and critical to firms’ economic
success).
165 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (describing the non-exclusive, four factor test judges apply when
determining whether a use of a copyrighted work is fair).
162
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and increase the chance that cultural adaptation could be permitted
under fair use.
IV. CULTURAL ADAPTATION IN COPYRIGHT
In a previous Article, I argued that Indian cultural adaptation of
Bollywood films should be recognized as an affirmative defense to
claims of copyright infringement.166 The Article focused on the burgeoning Indian film industry and framed the issue of cultural adaptation within the context of law and economic development.167 In
particular, it argued that cultural adaptation was a logical extension
of existing copyright infringement exceptions given its similarity to
other recognized copyright defenses, such as the uncopyrightability
of facts, the idea/expression dichotomy, scène à faire, and fair
use.168 It also stressed the difficulties of enforcing copyrights in India169 and the growing amount of legal scholarship that suggests that
weaker intellectual property laws can help promote growth in developing countries.170
While the Article suggested that the model of recognizing cultural adaptation as a copyright exception could be expanded to other
countries, such as Nigeria and its Nollywood film industry,171 it did
not examine cultural adaptation in countries with more long-standing copyright regimes, such as the United States. In contrast, this
Article aims to fill that lacuna by arguing that cultural adaptations
should be more broadly permitted under U.S. copyright law through
the fair use doctrine.
The copyright regimes in India and the United States share many
similarities, in part due to both countries deriving their copyright
laws from their shared, former British colonizers.172 But the extant
166

See generally Goodyear, supra note 16.
See id.
168 See id. at Part V(B).
169
See id. at Part III(E).
170 See id. at Part IV.
171
See id. at Part V(F).
172 U.S. copyright law is derived from the initial British Statute of Anne in the eighteenth
century. COHEN ET AL., supra note 147, at 7–8. The British East India Company enacted
the first copyright law in India, the Copyright Act of 1847. Ayush Verma, An Overview of
the Copyright Act, 1957, IP LEADERS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://blog.ipleaders.in/an167
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copyright laws in both countries today—the Indian Copyright Act
of 1957 and the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976—share important differences in their limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright
holders. In particular, fair use (or fair dealing, as it is called in India)
is substantially different in both countries.173 The following Sections
provide an overview of Indian fair dealing and American fair use. It
explains the separate analysis I undertook in my earlier Article, and
illustrates why permitting cultural adaptations is appropriate under
the U.S. legal regime. Indian fair dealing is rigid in its exceptions,174
while U.S. fair use involves a holistic weighing of four non-exclusive factors.175 These differences present a greater possibility for
cultural adaptation to be included within the American fair use analysis than is seen under Indian fair dealing. This allows one to consider cultural adaptation under U.S. law as a potentially permitted
practice under the existing fair use doctrine,176 rather than as a
standalone exception like under Indian law.177 The final Section of
this Part analyzes how cultural adaptations would likely be interpreted under U.S. fair use.
A. Fair Dealing in India
The Indian Copyright Act of 1957 contains over thirty specific
exceptions to exclusive rights of a copyright holder.178 These exceptions are generally quite narrow, with each delineating a specific authorized use of a copyrighted work or phonorecord. For example,
Sections 52(1)(b)–(c) permit transient storage of copyrighted works
in electronic communications and in providing electronic links and
access.179 Sections 52(1)(d), (e), (q), and (r) allow reproduction of
documents related to the legislature and judiciary.180 The other
overview-of-the-copyright-act-1957 [https://perma.cc/G9U4-TJGK]. The British
government also instituted the Indian Copyright Acts of 1911 and 1914. Id.
173 See infra Parts (IV)(A)–(B).
174
See The Copyright Act, 1957, §§ 52(1)(a)–(z) (India).
175 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
176
See infra Part IV(C).
177 See Goodyear, supra note 16, at Part V(B).
178
The Copyright Act, 1957, §§ 52(1)(a)–(z) (India).
179 See id. § 52(1)(b) (addressing transient storage in an electronic communication to the
public); id. § 52(1)(c) (addressing transient storage in providing electronic links or access).
180 Id. § 52(1)(d) (addressing reproduction for judicial proceedings); id. § 52(1)(e)
(addressing reproduction of legislative work prepared by the Secretariat of a Legislature
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exceptions to exclusive rights under Section 52(1) are similarly discrete.181 Many of these exceptions are quite similar to the exceptions
set forth under the U.S. Copyright Act, as will be described in the
following Section.
Perhaps the broadest exception under Section 52(1) is fair dealing. But even the fair dealing exception is restricted to three specific
cases: use for the purposes of “(i) private or personal use, including
research; (ii) criticism or review, whether of that work or of any
other work; or (iii) the reporting of current events and current affairs,
including the reporting of a lecture delivered in public.”182 These
permissible purposes effectively reflect the preamble to Section 107

exclusively for use by members of that Legislature); id § 52(1)(q) (addressing reproduction
of any legislative act or judicial order); id. § 52(1)(r) (addressing translation in any Indian
language of a legislative Act).
181 Id. § 52(1)(aa)–(ad) (addressing specific uses of computer programs); id. § 52(1)(f)
(addressing reproduction in certified copies); id. § 52(1)(g) (addressing reading of
reasonable extracts from published literary or dramatic works); id. § 52(1)(h) (addressing
publication in a collection for instructional use); id. § 52(1)(i) (addressing reproduction for
instruction, exams, or answers to exams); id. § 52(1)(j) (addressing performance for an
educational institution); id. § 52(1)(k) (addressing public performance of recording in
residences or non-profit organizations); id. § 52(1)(l) (addressing performance of a literary,
dramatic, or musical work by amateurs or a religious institution not for a profit); id. §
52(1)(m) (addressing reproduction of a current event article in a periodical); id. § 52(1)(n)
(addressing library electronic copies for preservation); id. § 52(1)(o) (addressing
reproduction of three copies for libraries if a book is not for sale in India); id. § 52(1)(p)
(addressing reproduction of an unpublished literary, dramatic, or musical work kept in a
library, museum, or other public access institution); id. § 52(1)(s) (addressing painting,
drawing, engraving, or photography of a work of architecture or displaying architecture);
id. § 52(1)(t) (addressing painting, drawing, engraving, or photography of a statue in a
public place); id. § 52(1)(u) (addressing inclusion of background in a cinematographic
work); id. § 52(1)(v) (addressing use of a mold, cast, sketch, plan, model, or study by an
artist); id. § 52(1)(w) (addressing making a functional three-dimensional object from a twodimensional artistic work); id. § 52(1)(x) (addressing reconstruction of a building by its
original architectural drawings or plan); id. § 52(1)(y) (addressing exhibition of a literary,
dramatic, artistic, or musical work in a cinematographic film following its copyright
expiration); id. § 52(1)(z) (addressing ephemeral broadcast recordings by the broadcaster);
id. § 52(1)(za) (addressing performance of a literary, dramatic, or musical work or
communication of a sound recording as part of a government or religious ceremony); id.
§ 52(1)(zb) (addressing reproduction for the purpose of disability access); id. § 52(1)(zc)
(addressing importation of copies of a literary or artistic work incidental to other goods
being lawfully imported).
182 Id. § 52(1)(a).
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of the U.S. Copyright Act183 on fair use. But, unlike U.S. fair use,
Indian fair dealing ends here. There is no balancing test, only three
specifically delineated permissible uses.
Under India’s fair dealing, there is little room for cultural adaptation. Unless the use fits under one of the three categories of fair
dealing in Section 52(1)(a), it cannot qualify for this exception. All
three categories are poor fits for cultural adaptations. The first category merely permits private uses, such as research, and excludes
public sharing of works.184 The second category only allows critiques, not works that build off original works.185 The third category
is limited to reporting, which does not include transformative works
that are developments of the original.186 Cultural adaptations build
off the original work, but do not fall within any of these three categories. The Indian Copyright Act’s narrow understanding of fair
dealing prevents other uses, such as cultural adaptations, from being
included.
B. Fair Use in the United States
Like Indian copyright law, the U.S. Copyright Act provides a
series of specific exceptions to the bundle of exclusive rights held
by the copyright owner. In the United States, limitations on a copyright owner’s rights—or exceptions to copyright infringement187—
183

17 U.S.C. § 107 (addressing “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”).
Notably, the preambular purpose of commentary, which is perhaps the most important for
transformative use under U.S. fair use, see infra Part IV(C)(1), is absent from § 52(1)(a) of
India’s Copyright Act. Cf. Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957, § 52(1)(a) (1957) (India).
184
See The Copyright Act, 1957, § 52(1)(a)(i) (India).
185 Id. § 52(1)(a)(ii).
186 Id. § 52(1)(a)(iii).
187 There is a debate about whether fair use is more accurately described as a defense or
a limitation on the rights of the copyright holder. Fair use is technically “not an
infringement of copyright” under § 107, which implies that it is not a defense. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107. But the Supreme Court in Campbell referred to fair use as an “affirmative defense.”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). The question of whether
fair use is best described as a defense or not is a complex one. See Lydia Pallas Loren &
R. Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement: Burdens of Proof in Copyright Infringement
Litigation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 621, 674–77 (2019) (examining the muddied waters
of defining the true nature of fair use); Reid, supra note 158, at 620 (advocating for labeling
fair use a defense instead of an affirmative defense as a method for reinvigorating the public
interest purpose in fair use).
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are specifically enumerated in Sections 107 through 122.188 Most of
these carveouts are rather narrow and limited to a specific type of
entity or media. For example, Section 108 details conditions under
which libraries and archives can reproduce copyrighted works.189
Section 109 sets out the first sale doctrine for the resale of copies
and phonorecords of copyrighted works.190 Sections 112, 114, 115,
and 116 establish special rules for the reproduction and public performance of musical works and sound recordings.191 Sections 111,
118, 119, and 122 relate to broadcasting exceptions.192 Sections 110,
117, and 120 articulate limitations on exclusive rights related to certain performances and displays, computer programs, and architectural works, respectively.193 Finally, Sections 121 and 121A establish carveouts to the reproduction right for the blind and the visually
impaired.194
Of the sixteen statutory limitations in the Copyright Act, the
broadest exception is Section 107: fair use.195 Fair use advances the
purpose of copyright “by allowing ‘others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work.’”196 The provision specifically notes that fair use includes reproducing or otherwise using
a copyrighted work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research.”197 However, instead of being limited to
these specific examples, like Indian fair dealing, Section 107
188

17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122.
Id. § 108.
190
Id. § 109.
191 Id. § 112 (addressing ephemeral recordings); id. § 114 (addressing the scope of sound
recordings); id. § 115 (addressing compulsory licensing for phonorecords); id. § 116
(addressing public performance by coin-operated phonorecord players).
192 Id. § 111 (addressing secondary transmissions of broadcast programming by cable);
id. § 118 (addressing the use of works in noncommercial broadcasting); id. § 119
(addressing secondary transmissions of distant television programming by satellite); id.
§ 122 (addressing secondary transmissions of local television programming by satellite).
193 Id. § 110 (addressing performances and displays); id. § 117 (addressing computer
programs); id. § 120 (addressing architectural works).
194 Id. § 121 (addressing reproductions for the blind or other people with disabilities); id.
§ 121A (addressing the Marrakesh treaty obligations).
195 Id. §§ 107–122.
196 Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).
197 17 U.S.C. § 107.
189
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articulates a non-exclusive four-factor balancing test to determine if
a use is fair, weighing: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market.198 The multi-factor test is judicially created—unlike many
other statutory limitations in the Copyright Act—as it was originally
established by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in the circuit
court decision Folsom v. Marsh.199 This is generally considered the
first fair use case in the United States.200
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance
of weighing these four factors holistically.201 In Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court—drawing from Judge Pierre
Leval’s seminal Harvard Law Review article202—elucidated transformativeness as a crucial consideration under the first factor.203 The
Court held that transformative works “lie at the heart of the fair use
doctrine[]” and “the more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors . . . that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.”204 To be transformative, a use must be “something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.”205
The holistic four-factor test has not, however, lent itself to neatly
delineated categories of what qualifies as fair use. Different courts
198

See id.
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (“In short, we must often, in deciding
questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”).
200
See Oren Bracha, Commentary on: Folsom v. Marsh (1841), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON
COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), https://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=commentary_us_1841
[https://perma.cc/EZH7-AV9L]. But see Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1372–73 (2011) (arguing that the history of fair use in the United
States should more accurately be considered to start with the English fair abridgment cases
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
201
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“Nor may the
four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and
the results weighed together, in light of the purpose of copyright.”).
202 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
203 510 U.S. at 578–79.
204 Id. at 579.
205 Id.
199
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weigh either the first or the fourth factor most heavily.206 In a study
of fair use cases from 1978–2005, intellectual property law scholar
Barton Beebe found that the overall weight of each factor varied.207
In decisions ultimately resulting in a finding of fair use, the first factor weighed in favor ninety percent of the time; the third factor
ninety-six percent of the time; the fourth factor ninety-five percent
of the time; and the second factor was used ambiguously at best.208
Beebe also found that courts differed in whether they evaluated each
factor in isolation or instead looked at the overall use of the work.209
In an updated version of the study, Beebe found that the fair use
application largely remained the same from 2006–2019.210 Beebe
determined that one of the most notable changes in recent years,
however, was the increased importance of transformativeness, concluding that “a finding of transformativeness exerts by far the greatest impact of any finding on a court’s likelihood of making an overall determination of fair use.”211 Other recent studies of fair use decisions also show that transformativeness is gaining a more dominant role in the analysis.212 However, even with transformativeness’

206

See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (looking at whether the works
added “new expression, meaning, or message”); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kinderseley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the new purpose of the
work was transformative); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[H]arm . . . to the market for, or the value of, the copyright for the original, ‘is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.’” (quoting Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985))); Philpot v. WOS, Inc., No.
18-CV-339-RP, 2019 WL 1767208, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2019) (stating that the fourth
factor is “the most important of the four”); Dhillon v. Doe, No. C 13–01465, 2014 WL
722592, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014).
207
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 597, 610, 615, 617 (2008).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 561–63.
210 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions Updated,
1978–2019, 10 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 4 (2020).
211 Id. at 25.
212
See Clark D. Asay et al., Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. REV.
905, 906–07 (2020) (finding through an empirical study that transformative use is “eating”
the fair use analysis); see also Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in
Copyright Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163, 240 (2019) (finding in an empirical study that
transformativeness is “approaching total dominance” in fair use determinations); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 715 (2011)
(tracing the rise of transformativeness in fair use determinations).
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increased importance, the fair use determination remains an extremely flexible application of the four factors, with courts applying
the factors holistically in different—and sometimes even contradictory—ways.213
Many critique the unpredictability of the fair use analysis.214 A
clearer set of rules could be beneficial for creators to know ex ante
whether their use of another’s work is fair.215 However, the current,
fluid approach to fair use is valuable within the copyright context.
The flexibility in applying all four factors allows courts to address
and incorporate new concepts and technologies as they emerge and
become more popular in the public space. For example, interpreting
certain uses of software as transformative promotes greater innovation and creativity in software creation.216 For works involving the
internet, courts can consider social media and digital interactions
that were not originally contemplated by the drafters of the Copyright Act in 1976.217 This same fluidity can allow courts to consider
anew the role of culture in fair use.

213

See Beebe, supra note 210, at 33 (explaining that the fourth factor still correlates the
most strongly with a finding of fair use and acknowledging that different cases have turned
on the first or fourth factors); Michael P. Goodyear, Fair Use, the Internet Age, and
Rulifying the Blogosphere, 61 IDEA 1, 7–13 (2020) (explaining how different courts have
emphasized either the first or fourth factor in fair use determinations).
214 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (“[F]air use in
America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”); Edward
Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1468 (2008)
(“Given the lack of clear rules for fair use and misappropriation, knowledge of copyright
law is often no better than ignorance of copyright law.”); Jessica Litman, Billowing White
Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 596 (2008) (describing fair use as “billowing white
goo”); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 433 (2008)
(arguing that fair use is difficult, if not impossible to define).
215 See Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
161, 198 (2017) (describing the potential benefits of “rulification” of fair use); Goodyear,
supra note 213, at 22–37 (elucidating which factors matter the most for a fair use
determination on blogs).
216 See Clark D. Asay, Transformative Use in Software, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 14–
19 (2017) (describing the important role of software reuses in classical fair use scenarios
and emphasizing how software reuses can be seen as transformative).
217 See generally Lauren Levinson, Adapting Fair Use to Reflect Social Media Norms: A
Joint Proposal, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 1038 (2017) (advocating for courts broadening their
understanding of transformativeness to address new digital innovations).
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C. Culture Through the Lens of Fair Use
While the fluidity of the fair use doctrine poses problems in
some cases, its flexibility creates the potential for cultural adaptation
to fit within its confines. Considering cultural adaptation in the analysis would be an issue of first impression for the courts. At least
between 1994, when Campbell was decided, and February 2022, not
a single federal copyright case addressed cultural adaptations in the
context of fair use.218
The fair use doctrine appears to acknowledge that the goal of
copyright is the proliferation of creative works. Fair use, by its very
nature, recognizes that few new works are created without borrowing from existing ones.219 As the Supreme Court has concluded, fair
use “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”220
As explained above,221 cultural adaptations seem to fall squarely
within derivative works under the Copyright Act, prohibiting creation without permission from the copyright owner of the original
work. While copyright law could be amended to specifically provide
for cultural adaptation, as proposed in India,222 U.S. courts can permit cultural adaptations under the extant fair use doctrine. In theory,
fair use allows new works to build on preexisting ones; in reality,
those uses permitted by courts vary due to the ambiguity inherent in
the fact-specific and holistic analysis.223 Existing fair use analysis
does not bar cultural adaptations, but rather leaves the outcome undetermined.

218

This conclusion is based, in part, on a review of the U.S. Copyright Office’s Fair Use
Index, which tracks major copyright fair use decisions. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., U.S.
Copyright Office Fair Use Index, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/fair-index.html
[https://perma.cc/95C3-QAAV].
219 Sag, supra note 200, at 1371.
220
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
221 See supra Part II.
222 See Goodyear, supra note 16, at Part V(B).
223 See supra notes 206–213 and accompanying text.
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The four enumerated factors are simply to be considered in the
analysis; they are not exhaustive.224 Thus, it is possible to independently consider culture under fair use. So far, however, courts
have almost completely limited their fair use analyses to the four
factors listed under Section 107. Therefore, the following Sections
of this Article will examine how cultural adaptations could be interpreted under the four factors of the fair use analysis to permit such
use.
1. The First Factor
The first factor, the purpose and character of the work, asks (1)
whether the use is for a commercial purpose and (2) whether the use
is transformative.225 This Section will examine cultural adaptations
under both subfactors in turn. The purpose and character inquiry is
especially important as it influences the outcome of the third and
fourth factors.226
Use of a work for commercial purposes weighs against a finding
of fair use; by comparison, using a work for an educational or nonprofit purpose weighs in favor of fair use.227 In addition, if it is customary to purchase a license for the type of use at issue, such use is
likely considered commercial.228

224

17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013)
(describing the Section 107 factors as “non-exclusive.”).
225 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing the
first factor of fair use as a two-prong analysis looking at commercial purpose and
transformativeness).
226
See Dr. Seuss Enters., LP v. ComicMix LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 451 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2803 (2021).
227 See Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the use
of a photograph on a blog that generated no income was educational and noncommercial);
Clark v. Transp. Alts., Inc., No. 18 Civ. 9985, 2019 WL 1448448, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 2019) (holding that a post on a non-profit organization’s blog was non-commercial);
Bell v. Powell, 350 F. Supp. 3d 723, 728–30 (S.D. Ind. 2018) (holding that the inclusion
of a photograph in an educational brochure about sexual assault was fair use); Dhillon v.
Doe, No. C 13–01465, 2014 WL 722592, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (finding fair use
where a non-commercial blog published a headshot in an article).
228 See Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2019) (asking
“whether the use was exploitative, in that others usually pay to engage in similar conduct,”
with the example of commercial enterprises usually purchasing licenses to use stock
photography, so a failure to pay for a license there weighs against a finding of fair use).
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Most cultural adaptations would qualify as commercial uses under this definition. Educational and non-profit uses of cultural adaptations would favor a finding of fair use, but many artists create cultural adaptations for profit. The commercial purpose behind forprofit cultural adaptations would likely weigh against a finding of
fair use.
However, a finding of transformative use considerably outweighs commercial purpose.229 A 2019 study found transformative
use as the only statistically significant consideration within the first
factor.230 Indeed, transformativeness is so powerful that the study
found it diminishes the impact of the second and third factors and
strongly affects how courts interpret the fourth factor.231 Therefore,
elucidating whether cultural adaptations are transformative may be
decisive in a fair use determination.
The definition of transformativeness is essential but remains
mired in the sweeping rhetoric of courts. In his 1990 Harvard Law
Review article, Judge Leval wrote, “the secondary use adds value to
the original—if the . . . [underlying work] is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the
fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”232
When the Supreme Court adopted Leval’s concept of transformativeness in Campbell, Justice Souter similarly concluded that the
purpose of the transformativeness inquiry is “to see . . . whether the
new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message.”233

229

See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001)
(stating that the user’s “for-profit status is strongly overshadowed and outweighed in view
of its highly transformative use . . . .”).
230
Liu, supra note 212, at 168.
231 Id.
232 Leval, supra note 202, at 1111.
233 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal citations
omitted).
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Since Campbell was decided, judges’ interpretations of when
use is transformative has varied considerably.234 At least one scholar
lambasted the transformative use inquiry, arguing that it improperly
focuses on what is new rather than what is creative, ultimately failing artists.235 This focus is problematic for artists, especially appropriation artists, and courts have been inconsistent in looking only at
what is new. In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit defined transformativeness as altering a work to create a “new expression, meaning, or message.”236 This adaptation does not require a brand-new
work; rather, it requires a work with an “entirely different aesthetic.”237 The Cariou decision echoed earlier opinions that focused
on a new purpose rather than a completely new work.238 In March
2021, the Second Circuit clarified this standard, emphasizing that a
transformative use calls not for just a new aesthetic, but for a different purpose or a new meaning or message.239
Over the past two and a half decades, courts have adopted an
increasingly broad understanding of transformative use, expanding
beyond parodies, quotes in biographies, and reverse engineering, to
uses such as appropriation art and research copies.240 While varied
interpretations continue to persist, scholarship has shown that judges
seem to agree that a work is transformative if it involves both physical transformation—the physical altering of a work—and purpose
transformation—using the work for a different purpose than

234

See Liu, supra note 212, at 204–16.
Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 565–67 (2016)
(citing the examples of Richard Prince, Jeff Koons, Shepard Fairey, Banksy, Elizabeth
Peyton, and Sarah Morris as being “caught in [the transformative use test’s] web.”).
236 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013).
237 Id.
238 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kinderseley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608–12 (2d Cir.
2006) (finding that the reproduction of seven copyrighted photographs was fair use due to
the new context and purpose of the photographs: to illustrate history in a history book).
239 Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99, 110–16 (2d
Cir. 2021), rev’d in part, vacated in part 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021). The decision was
slightly revised in August 2021 in light of the Supreme Court decision in Google, LLC v.
Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
240 See Liu, supra note 212, at 171. But see Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts v.
Goldsmith, 992 F.4th 26, 41 (2d Cir. 2021) (tightening the standard for fair use, noting that
adding something new refers to a different purpose or conveying a new meaning or
message).
235
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originally intended.241 This scholarship demonstrates the crux is that
the work has been adapted for a different purpose.242
Individual courts’ decisions appear to support this, but fact-specific differences remain. Courts have generally determined that altering either the purpose or context of the work—compared to
merely embedding copyrighted content for illustrative purposes—
qualifies as transformative.243 But courts have also reasoned that
merely displaying a copyrighted work in a new context is insufficient to qualify as a transformative use.244 For example, in Brammer
v. Violent Hues Productions, LLC, the Fourth Circuit went even further by holding that merely using a photograph for its content but
not for a new purpose is not transformative.245 The Brammer court
emphasized a new purpose rather than a new context.246 Similarly,
in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit found an alleged parody of The Cat in the Hat about the O.J.
Simpson double murder trial—titled The Cat NOT in the Hat! A
Parody by Dr. Juice—was not a transformative use, as the work
241

See Liu, supra note 212, at 169–70 (“[C]ourts unsurprisingly found transformative
use in 100% of the decisions involving both physical and purposive transformation.”).
242 See Liu, supra note 212, at 170 (finding that where judges found only physical
transformation, 32.7% of uses were found to be transformative, and where judges found
only purpose transformation, 60.7% of decisions ultimately found a transformative use);
see also Andy Warhol Found., 992 F.4th at 42 (emphasizing that courts should primarily
look at whether a use has a different purpose).
243 See Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that
surrounding commentary in a blog post changed the context of the copyrighted work in a
transformative way); see also Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP, 756 F.3d
73, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Courts often find such uses [of copyrighted works] transformative
by emphasizing the altered purpose or context of the work, as evidenced by the surrounding
commentary or criticism.”); see also Otto v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 412,
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[T]he use of an image solely to illustrate the content of that image,
in a commercial capacity, has yet to be found as fair use in this District.”).
244 See, e.g., Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2019)
(finding that the mere inclusion of a photograph in a new context was not enough to be
transformative); Ferdman v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 3d 515, 534 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (finding that an article merely containing a photograph was not transformative);
Barcroft Media Ltd. v. Coed Media Grp., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 339, 351–52 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (finding that the display of images in the exact same way for the exact same purpose
as the original work was not transformative).
245 922 F.3d at 264.
246 Id. at 263 (looking at whether a new use would “generate a societal benefit by imbuing
the original with new function or meaning” (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007))).
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used Dr. Seuss’ style without infusing a different meaning or commenting on The Cat in the Hat itself.247 This holding was recently
upheld in another Dr. Seuss case involving a work, Oh the Places
You’ll Boldly Go, which placed Star Trek characters and motifs inside the framework of Dr. Seuss’ Oh the Places You’ll Go.248
Alternatively, in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley,
new context was an important indicator of transformative use.
There, the Second Circuit found that placing reproductions of concert posters in a history book for illustration purposes created a completely new context for the posters that was sufficiently transformative.249 Similarly, in Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit held that
a work need not comment on the original work to qualify as a transformative use—adding “new expression, meaning, or message” was
sufficient.250
Perhaps most important to transformative use is that the work
adds something significantly new and changes the original work’s
expression. Courts have repeatedly stated that the new creator must
do more than merely try to “get attention” and “avoid the drudgery
in working up something fresh.”251 Instead of simply using existing
characters and plots, a transformative use should “feature[] plot elements found nowhere within the covers” of the original work.252
Fitting within this understanding, cultural adaptations can significantly alter existing expressions to create new works. Though
not all cultural adaptations necessarily meet this test, those that add
significant expression (i.e., significantly modifying aspects of the
247

109 F.3d 1394, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1997).
Dr. Seuss Enters., LP v. ComicMix, LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 452–53 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2803 (2021) (explaining that “broadly mimic[king] Dr. Seuss’[s]
characteristic style” is not the same as “hold[ing] his style up to ridicule,” and was merely
retelling the same tale with the expressive elements of Dr. Seuss (quoting Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d at 1401) (internal quotations omitted)).
249
448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006).
250 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994)); see also Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, 992
F.4th 26, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2021) (upholding Cariou’s emphasis on new meaning or
message).
251 Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d at 1401 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
252 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001)
(describing the transformativeness of The Wind Done Gone, a fictional work on Gone with
the Wind).
248
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work to make it fit a different cultural group) create works with substantially different feels, messages, and norms. Cultural adaptations
aim to reach audiences missed by the original works, frequently because cultural norms expressed in the original do not appeal to other
cultures. This is certainly the case in India, where U.S. films that
experience little success become hugely popular as Bollywood adaptations.253 Incorporating cultural norms of a specific group can
make a previously unenticing work more attractive to that group.
Accordingly, the significant changes necessary to cultural adaptations likely favor the new context inquiry, as well as the new purpose inquiry by speaking to different cultural audiences.
In addition to the context/purpose test, some courts continue to
emphasize criticism, the original transformativeness inquiry from
Campbell.254 On its face, requiring a subsequent work be critical of
the original seems to qualify only a narrow subset of works. But
copyright scholars employing literary theory understand criticism to
broadly encompass almost any retelling that comments on the original in some way.255 Under this understanding of criticism, most cultural adaptations would qualify as commentaries, because they almost all comment on the original to some degree. Cultural adaptations identify and supplant aspects of the original that would not appeal to a new cultural audience, essentially commenting on these
culturally unappealing aspects. The very cultural adaptation itself
shows the work may have ignored—whether through design or

253

See Goodyear, supra note 16, at Part V(D) (for example, the first major Hollywoodproduced Bollywood film, Saawariya, only made a profit of $2 million at the box office
after post-production costs).
254 See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1199 (2007) (“[C]ourts inquire whether the retelling is ‘transformative’; to
satisfy this criterion, the work must contain a discernible element of critical commentary.”).
255
See id. (“[W]ithin the framework of literary theory this test is broad enough to
encompass almost anything . . . .”); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and
the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 474,
496 (2006) (“[T]he representations offered through slash give us a critical vantage point
from which to critique, analyze, and reinterpret the cultural products that are [originally]
offered . . . .”); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and
Subcultural Creativity, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 137, 143 (2007) (“[M]eaning cannot
be imposed by authors or owners but rather is negotiated among texts, authors, and
audiences.”).
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not—different cultural perspectives, being limited to particular (often dominant) cultural audiences.
No matter which test is employed for transformative use, at least
some cultural adaptations would appear to qualify as transformative
uses. Reimagining existing works in different cultural contexts and
reaching different cultural audiences adds significant expression to
works under the context/purpose test, while also commenting on the
cultural shortcomings of an original work.
2. The Second Factor
The second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—evaluates whether the original work is creative or factual and whether it
has been published.256 Compared to the first factor, the second factor’s analysis is streamlined. Many courts also note that the second
factor is rarely dispositive of a fair use analysis outcome.257
256

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (citing cases that
compared soon-to-be published speech with published speech and creative and factual
works).
257
Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2018) (“This
factor ‘has rarely played a significant role in the determination of a fair use dispute,’ and it
plays no significant role here.”); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 220 (2d Cir.
2015) (“The second factor has rarely played a significant role in the determination of a fair
use dispute.”); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The second statutory
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work is rarely found to be determinative.”); Dr. Seuss
Enters., LP v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that
the second factor “typically has not been terribly significant in the overall fair use
balancing . . . .”); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
overruled on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1183 (2021) (noting that the circuits agree that the
second factor typically has not been that significant in the overall fair use analysis);
Ferdman v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 3d 515, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (undertaking
a second factor analysis, but noting “[t]his factor ‘has rarely played a significant role in the
determination of a fair use dispute.’” (internal citations omitted)); Otto v. Hearst
Commc’ns, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 412, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[T]he second factor does not
carry much weight in the fair use analysis and is ‘rarely found to be determinative.’”
(internal citations omitted)); Arrow Prods., Ltd. V. Weinstein Co., LLC, 44 F. Supp. 3d
359, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]his factor ‘may be of less (or even of no) importance when
assessed in the context of certain transformative uses.’ In the end, this factor is rarely found
to be determinative.” (internal citations omitted)); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Pirro, 74
F. Supp. 3d 605, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[B]ecause the Work is factual and has been
published, this factor favors a finding of fair use . . . .[H]owever, this factor is rarely
determinative.”); Asay et al., supra note 212, at 942 (finding in an empirical study that the
second factor had little impact on the overall fair use analysis). But see Robert Kasunic, Is
That All There Is? Reflections on the Nature of the Second Fair Use Factor, 31 COLUM.
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Regardless, this factor has influenced some courts and cannot
simply be ignored.258 Indeed, recently in Google v. Oracle, the Supreme Court found that the nature of the copyrighted work (in this
case, software declaring code) played a formative role in finding fair
use.259
Unlike the first factor, it is less certain how cultural adaptations
would be interpreted under the second factor. While both are factspecific determinations, the nature of cultural adaptations favors a
transformativeness finding. Cultural adaptations vary in their uses
of published works, unpublished works, factual works, and creative
works. While using a published or factual work favors fair use, unpublished and creative works would likely necessitate a greater degree of transformative use.260
3. The Third Factor
The third factor evaluates the amount and substantiality of the
use.261 Courts look at both how much the new work takes from the
original and how important these aspects are to the original work.262
The third factor weighs most heavily in favor of a finding of fair use
in cases where the original work is used in only a fleeting or de minimis way.263 However, like the second factor, the first and fourth
factors can still override a finding against fair use under the third

J.L. & ARTS 529, 530 (2008) (arguing that the second factor could be reimagined to play a
more essential role in the fair use analysis).
258 See Beebe, supra note 210, at 31 (“[T]he data suggest that certain findings under both
of factor two’s subfactors—whether the work is creative or factual and whether the work
is published or unpublished—continue to have an at least statistically significant effect on
a court’s overall determination.”).
259 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1202 (2021). (“[T]he declaring code is, if copyrightable at all, further
than are most computer programs (such as the implementing code) from the core of
copyright.”).
260 See Liu, supra note 212, at 168 (determining that a finding of a transformative use
diminishes the impact of the second factor); see also Asay et al., supra note 212, at 945–
46 (“[C]ourts often decide a particular factor is not fair, but note within that discussion that
that determination does not matter much because other factors outweigh it.”).
261 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
262
Asay et al., supra note 212, at 916 (“[C]ourts consider subfactors relating to both the
quantitative and qualitative amount of the borrowing.”).
263 See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 410–11, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (finding fair use where photographs only appeared in the background of a particular
movie scene for one and a half minutes).
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factor. The third factor is weighed against the first, and it is permissible to copy even a substantial part of the original work if it is necessary for a transformative purpose.264 Therefore, even copying the
bulk of another’s work is not determinative if there is strong transformative use or lack of market effect.265
The third factor’s outcome for cultural adaptations would be
highly fact specific. Cultural adaptations that merely borrow only a
trifling amount and non-essential parts of the original’s expression
are more likely fair use. In contrast, works that take a substantial
part from the original’s expression would be less likely to be fair
use—especially if that part contains core expressions central to the
original work’s value. Importantly, taking less from the original and
developing more of one’s own content is favored under both the
third factor and the transformativeness consideration within the first
factor.266
4. The Fourth Factor
The fourth factor looks at the effect of the use on the potential
market for the copyrighted work.267 It evaluates whether using the
original work could act as a substitute within its respective or prospective markets.268 To prove the market is encroached upon by the
second user’s creation, the original copyright owner must prove that
the user caused a tangible (not merely speculative), detrimental effect on the market for the original work.269 While licensing the use
264

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87 (“The third factor asks whether ‘the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole’ . . . are
reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.” (internal citations omitted)).
265
See Adjmi v. DLT Ent., Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that
the “play is a highly transformative parody of the television series that, although it
appropriates a substantial amount of Three’s Company, is a drastic departure from the
original . . . .”).
266 See supra Part IV(C)(1), (3).
267
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
268 Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that a
publication had a minimal effect on the photography business of the original creator of the
work); Ferdman v. CBS Interactive, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 3d 515, 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(stating that market effect weighs against fair use where the “[d]efendant’s use of these
photographs is a perfect substitute for the intended market.” (citing BWP Media USA, Inc.
v. Gossip Cop Media, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 395, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2016))).
269 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (stating that the court must consider “whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a
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can be influential under the fourth element, it is not determinative.270
For example, in Google v. Oracle, the Supreme Court held that loss
of revenue through licensing is not the whole analysis under the
fourth factor, finding that Google entered a market that Oracle was
not able to enter.271 Therefore, similarly to the transformative use
determination, the fourth factor largely turns on whether the new
work was for the same purpose as the original, or for a different and
unrelated purpose.272
Because cultural adaptations are aimed to serve originally overlooked markets, cultural adaptations affect those markets the original work was unable to exploit. While the existence of a licensing
system could shift the fourth factor against a finding of fair use, that
factor is not determinative and the infringement upon the original
work’s market is more important.
The most important aspect of the fourth factor, then, is showing
that different cultural markets are sufficiently distinct. The music
industry is replete with examples of this differentiation. Different
versions of songs were created for white and Black audiences during
the first half of the twentieth century.273 Part of the rationale was the
substantially adverse impact on the potential market.” (quoting NIMMER, supra note 146,
at § 13.05(A)(4) (1993))); Bell v. Powell, 350 F. Supp. 3d 723, 729 (S.D. Ind. 2018)
(dismissing the assertion that there was a market effect where the purported effect was
“highly speculative.”).
270 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kinderseley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir.
2006) (noting that “[a] publisher’s willingness to pay license fees for reproduction of
images does not establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative, make fair use of
those images.”); see also Dhillon v. Doe, No. C 13–01465, 2014 WL 722592, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (noting that a user can show that a market did not exist where a
licensing fee was never sought by the copyright owner at any time).
271 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1206–09 (2021). But see id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Google’s actions “eliminated Oracle’s opportunity to license its code for that use.”).
272 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (1994) (noting that the inquiry “must take account not
only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.” (quoting
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985))); see also
Barcroft Media, Ltd. V. Coed Media Grp., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 339, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(noting that using a work for the same purpose shows usurpation of the market); see also
Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 922 F.3d 255, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that since
the heart of the work was copied, the plaintiff “need not demonstrate that the licensing
market for his Photo would be depressed should [the defendant’s use] became
widespread.”).
273 See Brauneis, supra note 11, at 7 (describing the mirror cover phenomenon in which
white artists recorded cover versions of songs created by Black artists).
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perception that white and Black consumers listened to different genres of music.274 Indeed, in Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records,
Inc., Judge Yankwich held that racial correlations with popular markets were distinct, preventing any significant consumer overlap.275
The differentiation of markets in the music industry was cultivated
by the recording industry, which established specific genres of music for different races, such as music for Black audiences, later relabeled as rhythm and blues (“R&B”).276
A similar phenomenon has perpetuated with Latin music. Despite Latin music’s diversity—including everything from banda to
salsa to reggaeton—U.S. music charts usually lump these genres together under a single broad category, “Latin music.”277 The Latinx
music market is incredibly diverse, with different songs appealing
to different subcultures.278 But this “nebulous and laughably broad
genre construct” illustrates the different music consumption patterns
between white and Latinx consumers.279 Many Latin music artists,
such as Ricky Martin and Enrique Iglesias, were initially popular
with the Latinx market, only breaking into the pop market (i.e.,
mainstream white consumers) when they started recording songs in
English.280 Artists who could release songs that simultaneously appealed to Latinx and white consumer markets were exceedingly
rare.281 The language barrier for white listeners has only recently

274

See id. at 8 (describing how major record companies perpetuated this differentiation
in listeners through racist and prejudicial practices).
275 90 F. Supp. 904, 912 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (implicitly endorsing the statement that the two
recordings were different in style, one a “race or blues and rhythm” recording, the other a
“popular” recording). For a thorough examination of this case on the issue of race, see
Brauneis, supra note 11, at 9–17.
276 See Arewa, supra note 58, at 595.
277 See Gary Suarez, Urbano Is Breaking U.S. Streaming Records, But English-Language
Media Hasn’t Caught Up Yet, REMEZCLA (June 18, 2019), https://remezcla.com/features/
music/urbano-breaking-streaming-records [https://perma.cc/3X3K-EUC3].
278
See Steven W. Bender, Will the Wolf Survive?: Latino/a Pop Music in the Cultural
Mainstream, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 719, 730 (2001) (noting, for example, “that marketing
to Cuban Americans in Miami is a different world from marketing to Mexican Americans
in Los Angeles.”).
279
Suarez, supra note 277.
280 Bender, supra note 278, at 723.
281 Id. at 723–24 (noting that Carlos Santana “stands alone for his history of success with
both Latino/a and Anglo pop audiences for recordings in English, Spanish, and Spanglish
that have spanned several musical generations.”).
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begun breaking down, with major pop hits like Luis Fonsi’s “Despacito” being sung primarily in Spanish.282
While economic analyses might be critical for showing a clear
market differentiation between original works and cultural adaptations, this evidence shows that the fourth factor likely weighs in favor of fair use. Appealing to an entirely different market would not
encroach upon the existing market and consumer base of the copyright owner. Instead, cultural adaptations would appeal to distinct
cultural consumer bases and improve the proliferation of works by
appealing to groups left out by the original.
5. The Outcome
Overall, applying the four-factor analysis to cultural adaptations
suggests that these adaptations could qualify as fair use. Though frequently commercial, such works have the potential to be transformative in purpose and context and to serve as commentary on the original work. The second factor is generally of little importance in determining fair use; but whether a cultural adaptation draws on published, unpublished, creative, or factual works is a case-specific decision by the artist. As to the third factor, the amount taken from the
original work will also vary significantly depending on each artist’s
use. The fourth factor—market effect—likely weighs in favor of fair
use if the cultural market for the adaptation is distinct from the cultural market for the original. Therefore, even if the second and third
factors weigh against a finding of fair use, the most important factors—the first and fourth—generally favor recognizing cultural adaptations as fair use.
To see how this would operate in practice, consider the work of
Kehinde Wiley, a famous contemporary artist known for his paintings of Black men, including, most notably, the official presidential
portrait of Barack Obama.283 One of Wiley’s works, Napoleon
Leading the Army Over the Alps, is an oil painting of a Black man
282

See Christian Koch, 13 of the Biggest Spanish Language Crossover Hits, CULTURE
TRIP (July 20, 2017), https://theculturetrip.com/europe/spain/articles/13-of-the-biggestspanish-language-crossover-hits [https://perma.cc/7AB5-NB95] (describing the unique
success of songs like “Despacito”).
283 See
generally About, KEHINDE WILEY STUDIO, https://kehindewiley.com
[https://perma.cc/G4T6-GU3T].
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on horseback.284 The work draws heavily on Jacques-Louis David’s
1801 portrait, Bonaparte Crossing the Alps, which depicts French
general (and later emperor) Napoleon Bonaparte heroically poised
on horseback.285 Wiley’s painting features the same horse with the
man posed in the same manner as David’s Napoleon.286 However,
Wiley is offering an alternative narrative from David’s work, featuring a contemporary Black man in place of Napoleon, replete with
camouflage fatigues and Timberland boots.287
While David’s portrait is in the public domain, if it were still
under copyright, these two paintings would provide an example of
fair use under the culture-conscious approach. While both portraits
may appeal to fine art collectors, Wiley’s painting seeks to address
a different audience and create a different narrative, specifically
highlighting the fact that Black and Brown people have, in many
cases, been written out of mainstream history.288 A court would
likely consider this purpose transformative, even though it takes a
significant amount from David’s earlier creative work. Furthermore,
the market for both works is at least partially distinct. While art connoisseurs and laymen alike can enjoy both paintings, the earlier
work attracts those interested in old world European portraiture,
while Wiley’s painting appeals to both those who enjoy contemporary art and those who wish to see greater Black representation and
perspectives in artwork. This example would likely qualify as fair
use.
On the other hand, consider the 2002 Hollywood movie Phone
Booth and the 2010 Bollywood film Knock Out, which an Indian
court held likely infringed the former and accordingly issued an injunction.289 Both works center on a person being held hostage in a
telephone booth while speaking with their captor on the

284

Napoleon Leading the Army Over the Alps, BROOKLYN MUSEUM,
https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/169803
[https://perma.cc/CD2H-FA6U].
285 See id.
286
See id.
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 See generally Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Sohail Maklai Ent. Priv., Ltd.,
(2010) 44 PTC 647, paras. 1, 34 (India).
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telephone.290 The broad plots of the movies are clearly the same, but
Bollywood has a long tradition of relying on outside films for their
inspiration.291 Knock Out adds several distinctly Indian elements,
such as quintessential song-and-dance sequences.
The Indian court did not address fair dealing, but a U.S. court
would likely find that Knock Out was not a fair use. There were undoubtedly some new elements in Knock Out that uniquely spoke to
Indian audiences, but it was largely the same plot as Phone Booth.
Under the first factor, the original work was not substantially transformed into a new work by the mere addition of Bollywood songs
and a political conspiracy element. Knock Out was also a commercial work, weighing the first factor against a finding of fair use.
Phone Booth was published, but it was also a creative work, rendering the second factor neutral. Large parts of the expression in Phone
Booth were used in Knock Out, causing the third factor to weigh
against a finding of fair use, especially as the use was not particularly transformative. Finally, while the Indian and U.S. film markets
are distinct, the works substantially overlapped, suggesting that
Knock Out affected the potential market for Phone Booth, at least in
part.
While Knock Out, as it was produced, was likely not fair use,
incorporating more Indian-specific mores and issues could have favored a different outcome.292 For example, if the male lead faced a
circumstance in the phone booth that would speak to an Indian audience but not a U.S. one, the work may have been sufficiently transformative to constitute fair use. Further cultural modifications to
Phone Booth would again increase the transformativeness of the
work, and thus the likelihood of a court finding fair use.
This example underscores that not all adaptations would qualify
under a culturally conscious consideration of fair use; the heart of
the work must be changed rather than a few peripheral details. This
approach to cultural adaptations permits new adaptations for diverse

290

Id. at paras. 9, 12.
Id. at para. 29; Goodyear, supra note 16, at 522–23.
292 See Goodyear, supra note 16, at 542 (describing Indian filmmakers’ approach to
borrowing content from U.S. films).
291
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audiences while still blocking works that largely freeride on the creative works of others.
V. THE BENEFITS OF CULTURAL ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Permitting cultural adaptations under fair use not only serves the
policy goals of U.S. copyright,293 but provides tangible benefits to
society. In particular, legitimizing certain versions of cultural adaptations under fair use would, within the confines of societal norms,
lead to the creation of more works, by and for cultural and racial
minorities, which would generate greater economic output and provide more opportunities for artists of color.
As a preliminary matter, while some lawful cultural adaptations
under fair use could perpetuate harmful appropriation of minority
cultures, two important considerations limit the extent of this risk.
First, as explained earlier in this Article, negative cultural appropriations by white Americans of Black, Native American, and other
non-white cultures have long been a fixture of U.S. society, notwithstanding the protections of copyright.294 Therefore, the inclusion of
cultural adaptations inside fair use would help balance the scales for
minority creators, as white artists have long capitalized on appropriative adaptations. Secondly, while copyright would endorse at least
some cultural adaptations, popular opinion would dictate the market,
restricting adaptations to those that are viable and likely to be successful. Social pressures would likely act to condemn more prejudicial or harmful cultural adaptations, much like how insensitive Halloween costumes incorporating Native American headdresses or turbans have recently been strongly rejected in popular discourse.295
Allowing cultural adaptations to be created through fair use
would almost certainly increase the number of works created. The
293

See supra Part III.
See supra notes 130–138 and accompanying text.
295 Austa Somvichian-Clausen, The History of Racist Halloween Costumes, and the
Progress We’ve Made in Saying Goodbye to Them, CHANGING AM. (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/diversity-inclusion/523694-the-history-ofracist-halloween-costumes-and-the [https://perma.cc/Q6LZ-2XSS] (describing how
Halloween costumes and attitudes toward them have changed since the start of the
twentieth century).
294
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copyright holder’s exclusive derivative work right can create a
chilling effect on secondary creation.296 Allowing a carve out from
the derivative work right under fair use would reduce this chilling
effect, allowing artists of color to create cultural adaptations with
less concern about infringement liability. These works would include perspectives on existing works from different races and cultures, enabling the very commentary fair use seeks to encourage.297
While not all works appeal to all audiences, recontextualization
in a cultural adaptation can place a theme or plot inside a different
cultural setting that appeals to cultural minorities.298 Since one’s
tastes are significantly influenced by race, among other social
groups, cultural adaptations would be principally aimed at appealing
to minority cultural experiences.299 Individuals also respond well to
seeing people of their own cultural background represented in arts
and media.300 In particular, children of color benefit from seeing
those who look like them depicted in art because it builds self-esteem and confidence in their identities.301 Artists from those cultures

296

See Tushnet, supra note 154, at 133–34 (explaining the chilling effects of copyright
on minority groups).
297
See Tania Inniss, Black Art Matters: Why Our Creative Visual Contributions Should
Be Valued and Represented More Widely, BLAVITY (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:43 PM),
https://blavity.com/black-art-matters-why-our-creative-visual-contributions-should-bevalued-and-represented-more-widely?
[https://perma.cc/78UV-E8VM]
(providing
examples of how Black artists provide different perspectives through art, such as “Titus
Kaphar [who] addresses erasure by amending paintings and sculptures of prominent figures
from American history and revealing their morally questionable legacies.”).
298
See Pager, supra note 4, at 403.
299 See Ludy & Mattes, supra note 109, at 19, 25 (describing food taste as influenced by
race and culture); see also Sonnett, supra note 114, at 53–61 (describing how one’s music
tastes are influenced by their race and culture).
300 Jennifer N. Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Empathy Constrained: Prejudice Predicts
Reduced Mental Stimulation of Actions During Observation of Outgroups, 46 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 841, 844 (2010) (finding that the brain reacts differently when
responding to one’s own race); Ellithorpe & Bleakley, supra note 121, at 1434–35 (finding
that Black adolescents preferred television shows where diverse—and particularly Black—
characters were represented).
301 Julie Dobrow et al., Why It’s So Important for Kids to See Diverse TV and Movie
Characters, CONVERSATION (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://theconversation.com/whyits-so-important-for-kids-to-see-diverse-tv-and-movie-characters-92576
[https://perma.cc/M6MZ-CF5J] (“There’s a relationship between low self-esteem and
negative media portrayals of racial groups, in addition to an association between poor selfesteem and the paucity of portrayals of a particular group.”).
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are particularly well positioned to create cultural adaptations that
speak to those communities’ experiences, norms, and mores.302
They can also offer essential perspectives on lived experiences and
the diversity of cultures that are often overlooked by mainstream art
establishments.303 As Black painter Amy Sherald eloquently put it,
“I always want the work to be a resting place for [B]lack people, one
where you can let your guard down among figures you understand.”304
Creating new works that appeal to neglected consumer bases
would also increase economic production. For example, in India,
U.S. films adapted into Bollywood movies fulfill a neglected niche
and are lucrative enough to generate (sometimes substantial) revenues and employ large numbers of people, from actors to crew to
caterers.305 An increased production in arts, especially for minorities, could improve prospects for artists financially supporting themselves and finding regular employment. In the United States, five
million people are employed in the arts and cultural industries,306
with this number on the rise.307 Increasing economic possibilities in
the arts benefits the U.S. workforce—especially minority workers—
and, by extension, the U.S. economy overall.

302

See John Singleton, Can a White Director Make a Great Black Movie?, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Sept. 19, 2013, 6:00 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/johnsingleton-can-a-white-630127 [https://perma.cc/L875-EG7X] (stressing the importance of
having Black involvement in creating movies about Black historical figures and Black
culture).
303
See Nicquel Terry Ellis, Art So White: Black Artists Want Representation (Beyond
Slavery) in the Met, National Gallery, USA TODAY (May 8, 2019, 10:32 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/05/05/black-artists-african-americanart-museums-galleries-collections-painting/3483422002/ [https://perma.cc/C8CJ-CE76]
(describing “a movement of Black artists and curators from New York to Atlanta who are
hosting exhibits, teaching classes and creating work that shines a light on Black culture,”
compared to the monolithic presentation of Black art available at major museums such as
the Met).
304 Noor Brara, Nine Black Artists and Cultural Leaders on Seeing and Being Seen, N.Y.
TIMES STYLE MAG. (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/t-magazine/
black-artists-white-gaze.html [https://perma.cc/N6Y5-QCDK].
305
See Goodyear, supra note 16, at 544, nn.193–96.
306 See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, ARTISTS AND OTHER CULTURAL WORKERS: A
STATISTICAL PORTRAIT iii (Apr. 2019), https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/Artists_
and_Other_Cultural_Workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN63-G5A7].
307 See id.
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Artists of color have been historically underrepresented in practically every sector of the arts.308 In Hollywood, lack of racial diversity on the screen and behind the scenes has been increasingly highlighted in the past few years, and underrepresentation for Black,
Asian, and other minority populations continues despite notable successes such as Ryan Coogler’s Black Panther and Jon M. Chu’s
Crazy Rich Asians.309 Black artists have been similarly underrepresented at art auctions, in galleries, and in museums.310 Increasing
representation of artists of color facilitates the U.S. population’s exposure to diversity, and should ultimately lead to greater acceptance
and understanding of cultural diversity.311 While white perspectives
have largely dominated U.S. art and media, artists of color can
change the narrative, providing their own cultural perceptions and
experiences.312 Allowing cultural adaptations through the fair use
doctrine provides a new path to a more diverse and understanding
art world.
CONCLUSION
The tension between race and copyright is deep-seated and
needs greater attention in legal scholarship. This Article offers but
one potential approach to help make copyright law more equitable
for artists of all races and cultures. Unlike India and other countries
with rigid exceptions to the rights held by copyright owners, the
United States has the flexible fair use exception. So far, cultural
308

See TOBIE S. STEIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PERFORMING ARTS
WORKFORCE 5 (2020) (“There is statistical evidence that the majority of artists, managers,
and board members do not reflect the racial and ethnic diversity of the U.S. population.”);
see generally Stacy L. Smith et al., Inclusion in the Music Business: Gender &
Race/Ethnicity Across Executives, Artists & Talent Teams, UNIV. OF S. CAL. ANNENBERG
INCLUSION INITIATIVE 1 (June 2021), https://assets.uscannenberg.org/docs/aii-inclusionmusic-industry-2021-06-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ESA-UBLD] (finding a continuing lack
of diversity in the music industry, especially at the upper echelons of music businesses).
309 See Piya Sinha-Roy, Filmmakers of Color Struggle Despite Sundance Success: “A
White Guy Would Always Land the Job,” HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 13, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/indie-directors-color-pushed-sundancesuccess-1278720 [https://perma.cc/76JU-FC67].
310 See Inniss, supra note 297.
311 See Vanderbilt, supra note 129.
312 See Brara, supra note 304 (interviewing artists “about making work that captures the
richness and variety of Black life.”).
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adaptations have been discouraged by the exclusive derivative work
right. However, certain cultural adaptations could—and should—fit
within the confines of fair use. Permitting cultural adaptations under
fair use promises to further the purpose of copyright in addition to
benefiting minority artists and society as a whole.
While this Article focuses on cultural adaptations, this is just the
beginning of the conversation concerning diversity and fair use.
Judges should approach the four-factor fair use analysis with an understanding of the challenges, realities, and possibilities for increasing diverse works. Courts can consider the cultural impact of not
only works by artists of color, but also artists of different genders,
sexualities, and socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as other axes
of difference. Incorporating an understanding of diversity into fair
use can foster more creative works from diverse authors and, ultimately, increase accessibility to and understanding of a more diverse
palate of artistic works.

